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Abstract 
 
Impacts of US LNG Exports on the Supply  
Security of the EU Natural Gas Market 
 
Sinem Okumus, M.S.E.E.R. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Larry Lake 
Co-Supervisor: William L. Fisher 
 
Advances in drilling technology and production strategies such as hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal drilling have made shale gas more accessible and have boosted 
US natural gas production. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects that 
indigenous production will exceed consumption and that the US could become a liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) exporter by 2016. While US natural gas production has boomed, the EU 
has been increasingly dependent on natural gas imports mainly from Russia. In addition to 
rising dependency on Russian natural gas, the dispute between Russia and Ukraine has 
disrupted delivery of Russian gas and has threatened the security of natural gas supply to 
the EU. This situation has compelled the EU to seek different suppliers to reduce Russian 
dominance of Russia. Considering 30 percent of EU natural gas imports come from Russia 
an increase in EU concerns about disruption of the Russian supply has fueled a discussion 
of US LNG exports.  
 vii 
As an alternative to Russian supply, US LNG exports are considered as a solution 
to mitigate the effects of supply interruptions and overdependence on Russia. Currently the 
most important question is whether US LNG exports will or will not be a panacea for the 
EU natural gas market. This study uses US LNG export scenarios to investigate the effects 
of US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market. Although I primarily expected that US 
LNG exports would not impact the EU natural gas market, the main findings are 
surprisingly different from the anticipation. The consequences are: 
1. Although US LNG exports are not an elixir for the EU natural gas market to 
improve its security supply, they will reduce the dominance of certain exporting 
countries. 
2. US LNG exports will not decrease the EU’s dependence on its suppliers due to the 
EU’s preference to import US LNG. This situation prevents any improvement of the 
security of natural gas supply in the EU.   
3. US LNG exports will result in a slump in natural gas prices and a rise in natural gas 
demand in the EU.  
 viii 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Issues related to the supply of primary energy resources have become a major 
challenge for the European Union (EU) members. A continually increasing energy demand, 
concerns about climate change and the EU’s stringent policies to de-carbonize its energy 
systems have promoted the consumption of less carbon-intensive fossil fuels (especially 
natural gas) over the last two decades. In addition, insufficient domestic natural gas 
production in the member states has created pressure on the EU. For this reason, access to 
affordable, stable and sustainable natural gas from multiple suppliers is at the top of the 
EU’s agenda. 
Although natural gas has been imported via well-connected pipelines from several 
exporting countries, such as Russia, Norway and Algeria, to supply the EU, some EU 
countries, such as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and Bulgaria, completely depend on 
a single supplier (Russia). The disputes between Russia and Ukraine, causing disruption of 
Russian gas in 2006, 2009 and 2014, and the expectation of serious reduction in future 
Russian gas production have threatened the security of natural gas supply at national and 
the EU level. Also those threats have increased energy expenditures in the EU countries. 
These hardships have compelled the EU to attempt to mitigate impacts of Russian gas 
disruption. Therefore, diversification of routes and sources to meet the EU’s natural gas 
demand has been the EU’s priority.  
According to the EU’s Energy Security Strategy (COM/2014/0330), more effective 
use of the opportunities to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the EU member countries 
is described as one of the measures to strengthen energy independence and to ensure the 
security of supply. When the construction period of new pipelines and capital-intensive 
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investment are taken into account, US LNG imports have gained importance in last two 
years. 
In contrast to many EU countries who have depended heavily on a single supplier 
for natural gas supply, advances in drilling technologies and production strategies such as 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have made shale gas more accessible and 
boosted indigenous natural gas production in the United States (the US). As a result of the 
shale gas boom, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects that indigenous 
natural gas production will exceed domestic gas consumption and that the US could 
become an LNG exporter by 2016. With the emergence of US LNG exports, both the US 
and the EU see the US natural gas as a remedy for reducing Russian hegemony in the EU 
natural gas market. 
Both sides have made numerous infrastructural and legal arrangements, but it is not 
yet known whether US LNG exports are a solution to the supply problem of the EU natural 
gas market. The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of US LNG exports to the EU 
gas market.     
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The shale gas boom in the US has had a positive effect on the US economy since 
2007. Today, increased US natural gas production provides opportunity to the US to 
become a net LNG exporter in the foreseeable future. Large capital-intensive investments 
have been made to maximize impacts of shale gas on the US economy, to be a natural gas 
exporter and to support the US’s allies (especially the EU countries). But some 
fundamental questions, leading research questions, should be answered before initiating 
LNG export from the US to the EU countries:    
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1. What advantages can the EU anticipate from natural gas imports from the US? Will this 
trade be a panacea for the EU’s countries to solve the problem related to the security of 
natural gas supply? 
2. Will the US natural gas export reduce the EU’s dependence on its main suppliers?  
3. Will the LNG imports from the US change the EU’s natural gas demand? 
1.2. HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses are:  
H0: Natural gas supply security of EU countries will not be affected by LNG imports from 
the US.  
H1: Natural gas supply security of EU countries will be affected by LNG imports from the 
US.  
At the outset, I expected my research to verify the null hypothesis (H0). 
1.3. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This study in five chapters is an analysis of the impacts of US LNG exports on the 
EU’s natural gas market. Chapter Two is a description of the basics of LNG markets: US, 
EU, and global. The methods used to accept or reject the hypothesis are explained Chapter 
Three. Chapter Four is a discussion of the assumptions used to analyze impacts of US LNG 
imports on the EU’s gas market and presentation of the results of the methods discussed in 
Chapter Three. The final chapter (Chapter Five) summarizes and draws conclusions.   
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Chapter 2: Overview of the LNG Market 
2.1. THE GLOBAL LNG MARKET 
Energy consumption has grown in recent decades due to significant increase in 
global population and higher demand by emerging economies. Figure 1 shows global 
primary energy consumption from 1965 to 2013. In that period, total consumption growth 
rose 2.6% per year and total consumption jumped from 3,765.1 million tonnes oil 
equivalent (Mtoe) in 1965 to 12,730.5 Mtoe in 2013 (BP 2014). Also more than 85% of 
global energy needs was fulfilled primarily by fossil fuels. 
Figure 1: Global Primary Energy Consumption (1965-2013) 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 
Fossil fuels have been at the heart of global energy use, but today, concerns about 
high energy prices and the energy supplies security are forcing all countries to transform 
their energy markets; the environmental policies have added to this transformation.  For 
these reasons, the use of natural gas, the least carbon-intensive fossil fuels, has increased 
dramatically in the last five decades; furthermore, it is expected to be the fastest growing 
fossil fuel in the near future. While its share of the global energy mix in 1965 was 15.6%, 
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it provided 23.7% in 2013 (BP 2014), and this share is anticipated to grow at a rate of about 
1.6% per year until 2040 (ExxonMobil 2015).      
The geographical mismatch between resources and consumers has led to significant 
growth in the international gas trade since the 1990s. To illustrate, while 85% of natural 
gas demand was fulfilled by indigenous production at the beginning of the 1990s, this rate 
decreased to 69.1% in 2013 (Figure 2). This abrupt expansion in the gas trade has been 
dominantly facilitated by pipelines that connect countries and continents. However, the 
rebalancing of global and local natural gas markets via gas pipelines is often faced with 
technical, economic, and even political restrictions (Cornot-Gandolphe, et al. 2003). These 
challenges in natural gas markets have generated intense interest in liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) since the 1990s (Figure 2). As shown in Figure 2, whereas in 1990 LNG accounted 
for only 3.7% of total global natural gas consumption, this rate increased to 9.7% in 2013.     
Figure 2:  Shares of natural gas production and import in total gas consumption (1990-
2013)1 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2014  
                                                 
1 When compared to total consumption, annual changes in the levels of natural gas storage are very small. 
For this reason, they are not taken into account while calculating ratios.  
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LNG, super-cooled (or cryogenically processed) liquid natural gas with 
approximately 1/600th of the volume of its gaseous state, can easily be stored and 
transported to energy-hungry locations without using pipeline. In addition to its 
transportation superiority, there are several reasons for the emergence of the global LNG 
trade: 
- LNG is purer than pipeline gas and has more stable composition, higher methane 
(CH4) and energy content (European Commission 2009). During liquefaction process, 
impurities in natural gas are removed from gas mixture.  
- Generally, natural gas is traded by pipelines, and they cross a number of countries 
and borders with possibly unstable political situation (Cornot-Gandolphe, et al. 2003). 
Unlike pipeline gas, LNG helps the importing countries to overcome political restrictions. 
- Trading natural gas in a liquid form provides flexibility to both importing and 
exporting countries. Regarding data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014, 
feeding key natural gas markets (Asia, North America and Europe) by means of pipelines 
can create economic and technical problems, and sometimes impossibilities because gas 
fields in these regions are remote or stranded. Under these circumstances, exporting 
countries, such as Middle Eastern countries, prefer trade natural gas as LNG to monetize 
stranded gas fields.  
From the aspects of importing countries, LNG offers the supply security. For 
example, EU has attempted to reduce its dependence on its main supplier (Russia) by 
importing LNG from various locations/sellers.  
- LNG becomes more advantageous than pipeline gas over long distances, 
especially for overseas when natural gas demand increases and LNG cost along the whole 
value chain reduces. In the LNG industry, as a rule of thumb, LNG is considered as the 
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more economical alternative compared with a pipeline for distances in excess of 2,000 to 
3,000 miles (Rogers 2010). This empirical assumption can also be easily seen in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Comparison of transportation cost ($/MBTU) of natural gas as a function of 
distance (mile) for offshore pipeline, onshore low pressure pipeline, onshore 
high and low pressure pipelines and also LNG    
 
Source: ENI (Economides 2007) 
In the following sections, the structure of the global energy market, initially, is 
examined. The global LNG demand and supply are identified, and then the LNG price 
formation and the factors influencing the global LNG trade are explored.   
2.1.1. Structure of the Global LNG Market 
Complexity of the multi-stage LNG production and delivery processes requires 
capital intensive investment for infrastructure (liquefaction, regasification plants and 
refrigerated tanker). Therefore, LNG was only traded within defined regions, and the global 
LNG market became the niche (new emerging) market until the 1990s. Over the last three 
decades significant alterations were observed in the global LNG market (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: The global LNG trade routes in 1990 and 2015 
 
(a) 1990 
 
(b) 2015 (expected) 
  LNG exporting countries   LNG importing countries 
Source: Poten & Partners, November 2013 
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Regarding Figure 4, in 1990, the LNG importing countries were located in three 
regions: North America (US), Europe (UK, France, Spain, Belgium and Italy) and Asia-
Pacific (South Korea, Taiwan and Japan). For the delivery part, there were two independent 
basins (Atlantic and Pacific). On the supply side, LNG exporters were located in North 
America (the US-Alaska), Middle East/North Africa (MENA) (UAE, Algeria and Libya) 
and Asia-Pacific (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia). In that year, 3.7% of global 
natural gas consumption was met by LNG and the LNG market became a fledgling market 
vis-à-vis other energy resources’ markets.  
In 1990 the supply chain was driven by long-term buyer and seller relationships 
due to requiring capital intense investment (Poten & Partners 2013). Purchasing LNG with 
long-term contracts (20-25 years in duration) mandated the utilization of the oil-indexed 
LNG prices. Starting from the 1990s the LNG spot market has begun to emerge with the 
impacts of the start-up new projects, blossoming of infrastructure for spot LNG market and 
the expiration of old long-term contracts (Alaska Support Industry Alliance 2013).  
In the last 25 years (between 1990 and 2015) although exporting and importing 
regions did not change too much, the global LNG market has become more competitive in 
both supply and demand sides due to considerable increase in the numbers of suppliers and 
consumers. For this reason, the LNG trade has become more complicated and more 
dynamic. In 2015, it is expected that LNG will be traded by 20 suppliers and 29 consumers. 
In spite of the fact that long-term agreements were dominant at the beginning of the 1990s, 
spot LNG trade will become between 25-30% of total LNG transaction (Poten & Partners 
2013).  
In the light of the structure of the global LNG markets between 1990 and 2015, the 
snapshots of the current LNG market can be listed as follows: 
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- Expanding LNG trade has created a link between consumers and gas producers 
who belong to distant reserves. 
-The main driver of the market has been the imbalance between indigenous supply 
and demand, and LNG is generally used as a supplement fuel rather than a primary fuel. 
Major shift in gas utilization pattern is not expected in the near future. 
- Economic development, industrialization, and improvement of living standards 
are the main determinants of LNG demand. While LNG demand was boosted by developed 
countries (Japan and South Korea) in the 1990s, primary LNG consumers have recently 
been developing countries, such as China and India. In the foreseeable future, this demand 
shift from developed to developing countries will shape the global LNG trade.   
-In addition to natural gas demand of developing countries, higher oil prices and 
the shale gas revolution in the US have spurred the development of the global LNG market. 
Especially, low natural gas prices in North America (the US Henry Hub) and the UK’s 
NBP (National Balancing Point) compared to oil prices have increased competitiveness of 
LNG with respect to other energy resources. Therefore, oil price level will become one of 
the main parameters for the global LNG market.  
- Geographically, the global market is segmented among the Atlantic, the Pacific 
and the Middle East regarding the routes of the global LNG trade. Unlike other two great 
ocean basins, the Middle East located between them has exported LNG to both markets 
(Jacobs 2011). Whereas LNG trade was made separately in the Atlantic and the Pacific 
basins in the 1990s, the growth in global natural gas demand has recently kicked off cross-
basin and inter-basin LNG trade.       
- At the outset LNG was marketed under the long-term contracts. Starting from 
early 1990s, spot and short-term LNG markets has emerged, and the share of these markets 
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in the whole trade became about 30% (International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas 
Importers (GIIGNL) 2014).  
- Under the ideal market conditions the LNG prices are expected to be formed 
regarding the LNG supply chain. But varying LNG prices from basin to basin disproves 
this anticipation. Whereas the LNG prices in the 1990s were close to each other because of 
the dominance of long-term contracts and utilization of oil-index price formula, the 
changes in the natural gas market structure caused LNG price divergence. To illustrate, oil-
linked LNG prices in Asia-Pacific, gas-on-gas market pricing mechanism in North 
America, and hybrid pricing mechanism in Europe have resulted in various LNG prices. 
This situation has prevented the construction of integrated global LNG market. In the near 
future, regional gas price mechanism is expected to persist. 
- The geographic isolation and inadequate domestic natural gas production have led 
to higher LNG prices. Asia Pacific countries are the best example for this condition. 
Remoteness of Asia Pacific countries from main LNG suppliers reduces the possibility of 
negotiation on the LNG price negotiation.   
- Emergence of the LNG spot market is directly related to an increase in surplus 
capacity of long-distance supply. The high entry cost of LNG production has been one of 
the main reasons preventing the development of the LNG spot market. For this reason, 
general tendency in the global LNG market is to trade LNG via long-term contracts. Under 
these circumstances, in the upcoming decades, while spot market is growing, a dramatic 
shift from long-term contracts cannot be expected (Černoch, et al. 2010).        
- On the supply side, a small portion of LNG is re-exported by importing countries, 
such as Belgium, France, Spain, Netherland and Portugal, located near shore. Re-
exportation is anticipated to continue especially in Europe. 
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2.1.2. The Global LNG Demand 
The global LNG demand is mainly related to the global natural gas demand, the 
status of pipelines, and the price of substitute fuels. Since 1965, the natural gas demand has 
grown substantially due to an increase in global population with a rate of 1.1% per annum, 
technological development, and stringency of environmental policy. As shown in Figure 
5, in 1965, 78% of natural gas consumption was stemmed from developed countries in 
North America and Europe. In 2013, this ratio decreased to 40% and natural gas demand 
shifted from developed countries to developing countries (China and India). 
Figure 5: Natural gas consumption by region between 1965 and 2013 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 
Much of increase in natural gas consumption is due to the growth in the use of 
natural gas to generate cleaner electricity. For this reason, the share of natural gas in power 
generation has risen reasonably (Figure 6), and gas consumption has increased by 63% 
since 1990. Due to stringent environmental policies in key natural gas consuming 
countries, natural gas demand is expected to grow. Therefore, natural gas producers, who 
want to monetize their natural gas resources, have focused on the LNG consumers, such as 
Japan and the EU countries.   
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Figure 6: Global natural gas consumption by sector between 1990 and 2010 
 
Source: Poten & Partners, January 2013 
LNG represents 10% of global natural gas trade and is utilized to fulfill both 
primary and peak natural gas demand. On the demand side, the LNG consumers are 
generally Asia-Pacific and the European countries. The share of Asia Pacific trade in the 
global market shown in Figure 7 is 75% of global trade in 2013. In this region, Japan with 
30% of total global demand is the largest consumer, followed by South Korea, China, India 
and Taiwan. In 2014, Japan, South Korea and China comprised 62% of the global LNG 
demand (Kato 2014). Due to Fukushima disaster in March 2011, especially Japanese LNG 
imports skyrocketed, so the share of Asian LNG trade in global trade increased 
significantly and unexpectedly after 2011 (Figure 7(b)). This growth was fulfilled via spot 
LNG trade by Japan. Regarding GIIGNL data, the share of Japanese LNG spot trade 
increased 20% in 2006 to 33% of the global LNG spot trade in 2013.     
The second vital LNG consumer is Europe. Although the European countries’ 
demand has fallen since 2010, this region is still second most important destination for 
LNG. The Asia-Pacific and Europe account for 90% of total import of LNG with the 
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balance going to South America (5%), North America (4%) and the Middle East (1%) (PFC 
Energy 2013).     
Figure 7: Global LNG Imports by region between 2006 and 2013 
 
(a) LNG import with long-term contracts 
 
(b) Spot LNG import 
Source: GIIGNL 
Countries located in North America were also the LNG importers to balance their 
indigenous natural gas markets. But an increase in unconventional gas production in this 
region has caused the reduction of natural gas imports. For this reason, 20% of the global 
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LNG demand accounted from this region in 2006, it plunged to only 4% in 2013. In the 
short term this reduction is expected to continue because of the shale revolution in the US. 
Since 2011 the conditions of the global LNG market have been changed and tight 
market conditions have been experienced despite the considerable expansion of 
liquefaction capacity. In addition to tight market condition, considerable growth in Asia 
Pacific region ascended the LNG spot prices. This increase in the LNG spot prices affected 
the global LNG demand growth and LNG demand has stayed on a plateau (240 Mtoe per 
annum). Environmental policies, depletion of existing gas fields (i.e. reduction of 
indigenous natural gas production) and an increase in natural gas demand are expected to 
trigger the LNG trade in the near future. According to Wood Mackenzie’s forecast 
(illustrated in Figure 8), until 2016 global LNG demand will be flat depending on oil and 
gas prices. If these prices change beyond expectations, graph given in Figure 8 also alters 
(Market Realist 2014). Regarding Figure 8, Asia Pacific is expected to be the key LNG 
consumer in the next decade with a growing demand due to having isolated LNG market 
with scarce resources. Secondly, although the EU’s natural gas demand has tightened since 
2011, its demand is forecasted to increase starting from 2017 because of plunging of 
Norway and Netherland’s natural gas production and stricter environmental policies.    
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Figure 8: Projected global LNG demand  
 
Source: Wood Mackenzie Q4 2013 LNG Tool2 (Market Realist 2014) 
Although future of LNG is seen as very bright by many analysis, recent plummeting 
prices of oil and gas can be game changer for the global LNG investment and trade. 
2.1.3. Global LNG Supply 
When key LNG customers (Japan South Korea, China and India) are considered, it 
is not surprising to see the primary LNG suppliers located in Asia Pacific and Middle East 
regions (Figure 9). Their proximity to key customers provides an advantage for these 
regions regarding prices.  
As mentioned before, the LNG producers with distinct characteristics disseminate 
globally. Whilst some are key oil and gas producers such as Qatar in the Middle East, the 
others such as Trinidad & Tobago and Brunei with large stranded gas reserves are generally 
small but effective players in the global LNG market.  
Although small portion of LNG has been re-exported by importing countries (like 
Spain, Portugal and Belgium), LNG is imported by counties where natural gas is extracted. 
For this reason, the main providers of LNG are Middle Eastern and Asia Pacific countries.  
                                                 
2 Utilization rate of nameplate capacity is assumed as 85%. 
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Figure 9: Global LNG export by type between 2006 and 2013 
 
(a) LNG import with long-term contracts 
 
(b) Spot LNG export 
Source: GIIGNL 
Historically, the Asia-Pacific region was dominant in both long-term and spot LNG 
markets. New suppliers from Middle East (such as Qatar) led to the reduction of Asia-
Pacific region’s market share. In 2006 while Asia-Pacific supplied 40% of the global LNG 
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demand, Middle East provided 31% of total. With starting a considerable LNG production 
by Qatar, Middle East became the world’s largest LNG supplier in 2013. Regarding 
International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL)’s 2013 report, Qatar 
supplied 33% of the global LNG need.    
According to Australian Government Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
(BREE), the global LNG supply is anticipated to expand rapidly to 2020 with a rate of 6.5 
per cent per annum starting from 2013 and total LNG trade will reach to 370 Mtoe in 2020 
(Australian Government Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 2014).  
Figure 10: Projected global LNG supply between 2000 and 2030 
 
Source: Poten & Partners, November 2013 
Figure 10 illustrates the global LNG supply between 2000 and 2030. Before 2020, 
new LNG suppliers, such as the US and Australia, are expected to be an LNG exporter to 
monetize their unconventional sources. With the entrance of new suppliers into the market, 
the amount of accessible LNG and competition in the market will increase rapidly, and this 
market transformation leads to lower the LNG prices. As a result, similar to other healthy 
energy markets, plunging LNG prices will trigger demand growth.   
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2.1.4. Global LNG Infrastructure 
Regarding the International Energy Agency (IEA), natural gas could be the 
“Golden Age of Gas” due to an increase in natural gas demand by more than 50% that 
accounts for over 25% of the world demand in 2035. And IEA emphasized that as a result 
of growth in natural gas LNG would become the “glue” to link the global gas markets. 
These expectations in the global LNG market has made the LNG infrastructure more 
essential to gain higher benefits from the LNG trade than before in the foreseeable future, 
To maximize profit from the LNG trade the entire LNG value or supply chain, backbone 
of the LNG market, should be understood.    
The LNG supply chain given in Figure 11, including conversion of natural gas to 
liquid and back to its gaseous state, requires multi-step processes. Subsequent to production 
of natural gas, gas is sent to a liquefaction plant by means of pipelines. In liquefaction 
facility, natural gas is firstly pre-treated to remove some hydrocarbons (propane, butane 
and ethane) and impurities (carbon dioxide and water). Under atmospheric pressure pre-
treated gas is cooled down to -162 °C (260 °F) to shrink the volume of natural gas. This 
liquefied natural gas is transported via double-hulled tankers or truck to its destination 
country (Stage 3) where LNG is altered to its original state by regasification utility. At the 
final stage natural gas is transmitted to the pipeline system for delivery to end users. 
Figure 11: The LNG supply chain  
 
Source: Morosuk & Tsatsaronis, 2012 
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Due to the complexity of the LNG supply chain, considerable amount of investment 
and specialized knowledge is necessary to implement this chain successfully. Under the 
light of the recent technological innovations, the distribution of capital cost of each unit of 
the chain is given in Table 1. As shown in this table, liquefaction unit comprises 30-45% 
of all LNG investment. Depending on the distance between supplier and customer, 
transportation cost of LNG varies.    
Table 1: LNG costs by supply chain segment 
Unit $/MBtu % of Capital Cost 
Upstream3 0.17-6.00 15-20 
Liquefaction 1.15-10.53 30-45 
Regasification 0.40-2.00 15-25 
Shipping 
(Round Trip) 
Intra-Basin 0.35-0.90 
10-30 
Cross-Basin 1.00-2.50 
Source: Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. DOE and PFC Energy (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) August 2014) 
In the following part, recent status of supply chain units in the global LNG market 
will be explained.   
2.1.4.1. Global LNG Liquefaction Terminals  
The liquefaction plants, generally consisting of parallel processing units (trains), 
are explained as the heart of the LNG projects and the largest single investment in the LNG 
value/process chain (Sakmar 2013). Long construction period, fluctuations of the global 
energy market, as well as the tremendous financial commitment4, make the building of 
these plants a challenging business (Du and Paltsev November 2014).  
                                                 
3 Upstream includes exploration and production (E&P), development, extraction, transportation, and storage 
of natural gas. 
4 Although at the outset of the 2000s the cost of building an LNG liquefaction plant was average 300 $/tpa, 
with the emergence of new innovations this amount has risen enormously and has been more than 1,000 $/tpa 
since 2010 (Du and Paltsev November 2014).   
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Commercially, first liquefaction plant started to produce LNG in 1964 and others 
have been on stream since then. As shown in Figure 12, while the LNG production 
increased slowly depending on the global LNG demand and the LNG infrastructure 
between 1964 and late 1990s, the growth in production has expedited after this period.   
Figure 12: Global LNG production between 1965 and 2013 
 
Source: BREE and Petroleum Economist (Australian Government Bureau of Resources 
and Energy Economics 2014) 
As Figure 13 shows that more than 40 liquefaction plants (export plants), located 
in 17 countries, produce nearly 300 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) (Songhurst February 
2014). Now two-thirds of the LNG liquefaction capacity and production is held by Qatar, 
Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia and Nigeria. Until 2020 with the growth in Australian and 
Russian liquefaction capacities and the completion of new plants in the US (Figure 12), the 
total liquefaction capacity is anticipated to escalate with a rate of 36%5 (International Gas 
Union (IGU) 2014). Similar to the growth in capacity, LNG production is expected to rise 
to 397 Mtpa in 2018 (International Gas Union (IGU) 2014) and approximately 600 Mtpa 
in 2025 (Songhurst February 2014). 
                                                 
5 This rate corresponds the period between 2013 and 2018. 
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In addition to 16 under-construction liquefaction plants, 21 new plants6 are planned 
to be constructed as of January 2015. But the plummeting of oil price starting in mid-2014 
has made the future of planned plants gloomy.  
Figure 13: Existing and new LNG liquefaction plants7    
 
Source: Poten & Partners, November 2013 
According to the global LNG demand, availability of feed gas or rising domestic 
gas demand, maintenance of plants, utilization rate of the LNG production plants vary from 
region to region. For example, in 2013 the utilization rate of the plants in Egypt and Algeria 
dropped significantly because of rising domestic demand; on the other hand, the utilization 
rate of plants in Qatar and Malaysia became more than 100% in that year to compensate 
the production loss resulting from Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt.   
LNG producing countries have focused on developing their market share and 
minimizing their production costs so as to maximize their profits. To achieve these goals, 
                                                 
6 This does not include suspended and cancelled plants. 
7 A number of LNG liquefaction plants and their locations have not changed since 2013, so this illustration 
(Figure 13) can be used to exhibit current situation of the global LNG market as of January 2015. 
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they have utilized new technological innovations both in onshore and offshore. The advent 
of floating production units (FPU) and floating production and storage units (FPSU) in 
offshore projects has created a new horizon to the natural producers who want to monetize 
their resources more economically.    
2.1.4.2. Global LNG Shipping Fleet 
After liquefying natural gas, next step is to transport LNG to customers. Primary 
transportation modes are by sea and truck and in a few locations by rail (Japan) 
(International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) 2009). The LNG 
trucking is most widely used for short-distance transportation to regasification facility by 
double-skinned tank trucks to decrease transportation cost and time. Depending on industry 
requirements, trucks with the capacity of 6 to 20 tons are generally used in many countries, 
such as the US, Japan, South Korea, the UK, Germany, Belgium, and Turkey. The LNG 
trucking, as well as transportation LNG via railroad, accounts for the smaller portion of 
total LNG delivery.  
Figure 14: The capacity of LNG carriers between 1970 and 2014   
 
Source: International Gas Union (IGU) (2014) and HIS Inc. 
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In contrast to transportation of LNG via truck or train, considerable amount of LNG 
is transported via sea in double-hulled LNG carriers. At the beginning of the 1970s, LNG 
shipment was a niche business, with significant growth in the global LNG demand8 it has 
developed abruptly. As shown in Figure 14, while the number and capacity of the LNG 
carriers were only 8 and 649,224 m3 respectively in 1970, 387 ships with the capacity of 
49.43 million m3 were in service in 2014.  
Today, the LNG carriers ranging in size from 18,000 to 266,000 m3 are used to 
transport LNG. Typically, vessels, with a capacity of 18,000 to 40,000 m3, are utilized in 
Southeastern Asia to smaller terminals in Japan. Although common class of the LNG 
carrier with a capacity between 125,000 and 149,000 m3 has been preferred, more recent 
addition to the fleet carrier has generally included the largest category including Q-Flex 
(210,000-217,000 m3) and Q-max (261,700-266,000 m3) (International Gas Union (IGU) 
2014).    
The main determinant of the charter rate is long- and short-term contracts. But some 
unexpected events such as the Fukushima disaster can lead to temporary large shipping 
prices. 
Over the last decade the LNG demand of energy-hungry Asia Pacific countries 
especially China and India has spurred the number of LNG fleet. For this reason, new 
carriers with an average capacity of 164,000 m3 have been ordered to be in service until 
2018. With these carriers, total capacity of the global LNG carriers is anticipated to rise 
approximately 30% or a compound average annual growth rate (CAAGR) of 7% (Du and 
Paltsev November 2014).         
                                                 
8 As a rule of thumb, 1-2 extra LNG carriers (depending on the size of carrier) should be in service for each 
additional 1 million ton of LNG production per year.  
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2.1.4.3. Global LNG Receiving/Regasification Terminals 
Regasification terminals are the final part of the LNG supply chain. In this part, 
LNG is gradually re-warmed to return it to its original state (gaseous state). These units 
have generally been located on shore. Over the last decade, new technological 
improvements, such as floating regasification unit (FSRU), have allowed prospective and 
current LNG exporting countries to gain fast and relatively cost-efficient access to the 
global LNG supply (Teekay LNG Partners L.P. 2015). 
As shown in Table 2, 108 LNG regasification/receiving terminals including 18 
floating units were in operation at the end of January 2015. The nameplate capacity of these 
terminals increased by a rate of 1.2% and became 985.8 Bcm/year (729.7 Mtpa). 
Proportional to regional LNG demand, 52% of global nameplate capacity of LNG terminals 
is located in Asia-Pacific region. In this region, the capacity of Japanese and South Korean 
terminals accounts for 78% of regional capacity. 
Table 2: The Global LNG regasification terminals (As of Jan. 2015) 
Region 
Nameplate 
Capacity9 
(Bcm/y) 
# of Floating 
Regasification 
Terminals 
# of Regasification 
Terminals (Total) 
Asia-Pacific 515.2 4 56 
Europe 192.9 4 24 
Middle East 20.5 4 4 
North America 229.7 1 17 
South America 27.5 5 7 
Total 985.8 18 108 
Source: GIIGNL, 2014 and Global Energy Info, 2015 
 Similar to the existing LNG regasification terminals, 16 new terminals10, which 
are under construction as of Jan. 2015, are generally located in Asia-Pacific region. In 
                                                 
9 Nameplate capacity is nominal/installed capacity of regasification facility. 
10 This does not include stalled and cancelled terminal projects. 
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addition to traditionally export-oriented Asia-Pacific region, investments on new 
regasification capacity expansion have started in some Middle Eastern countries. Although 
considerable amount of expansion in the capacity of LNG regasification terminals is 
planned to be constructed, many of them have been recently cancelled or suspended due to 
the unexpected decrease in oil prices and tight global LNG demand (Global Energy Info 
2015).  
Figure 15: The capacity of global regasification terminals between 2000 and 2018 
 
Source: International Gas Union (IGU), 2014 
Figure 15 illustrates the development of the capacity of LNG regasification 
terminals over the last two decades. Especially, in the last decade a large amount of idle 
regasification capacity has been observed due to the growth of regasification capacity and 
gradual decline in the LNG demand of some regions like North America and Europe. In 
the foreseeable future, developments in the LNG regasification terminals are directly 
related to the status of terminals in Asia-Pacific and North America. As planned, if many 
nuclear power plants restart, the LNG demand in Asia Pacific is anticipated to plunge 
significantly. Also, if the plummeting price of oil continues, this leads to narrow the price 
gap between Asia-Pacific and the other regions and to make the LNG trade less attractive 
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for the exporting countries. Therefore, a considerable increase in the capacity of global 
LNG regasification terminals is not expected until 2018.     
2.1.5. Global LNG Prices 
In the global LNG market, dominance of long-term contracts between suppliers and 
buyers makes the global LNG market illiquid and also leads to form different price 
mechanisms in Asia Pacific, North America and Europe. Since the 2000s expansion of spot 
LNG market with a greater traded LNG volume, growth of portfolio traders11 and 
liberalization of the natural gas markets in North America and the UK have increased the 
liquidity of the global LNG market. This market shift has caused the diversification of the 
LNG prices from region to region. Highly regionalized LNG prices mean that vessels 
carrying LNG to the same country can deliver LNG at considerably different prices 
(Australian Government Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 2014). For this 
reason, unlike crude oil pricing, there is no global index to characterize the LNG price in 
the global LNG market. 
To understand price mechanism in the LNG market, in the following sections, the 
regional LNG pricing and arbitrage opportunities will be explained.  
2.1.5.1. Regional LNG Pricing 
On the supply side, the LNG exporting countries have preferred long-term contracts 
to mitigate the high investment risk related to the high capital costs of LNG supply chain. 
Similar to the LNG suppliers, the LNG importing countries have generally tended to sign 
up for long-term contracts to provide energy security. The evolution of contracting 
practices has become the fundamental determinant of the regional LNG prices. Since the 
mid-1980s the deregulation of the natural markets in North America and some of the 
                                                 
11 Portfolio traders provide LNG from various suppliers in their portfolio. 
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European countries have taken place, competitive forces have affected the market structure 
and operation. For this reason, the mechanisms of the regional LNG prices have diverged 
from region to region. 
Figure 16: Monthly prices of regional LNG, natural gas, and oil 
 
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and World Bank 
As it is illustrated in Figure 16, the price mechanisms (oil-indexed, hybrid pricing 
and gas-to-gas pricing) lead to significant difference among the regions. While gas-to-gas 
pricing is resulted in the lowest LNG prices, oil-indexed pricing increases the economic 
burden on the LNG importing countries using oil-indexed pricing mechanism.  
2.1.5.1.1. Prices in Asia Pacific Countries 
Both historically and currently, Asia Pacific countries (such as Japan, South Korea, 
China and Taiwan), the key consumers in the global LNG market, have predominantly 
traded LNG by using oil indexed long-turn contracts lasting for 15 to 25 years. Almost all 
LNG prices in this region have been determined via the average Japan Crude Cocktail 
(JCC) that is the monthly average price for crude oil imports into Japan. Although JCC is 
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estimated by taking into account the prices of 200-crude oil from 30 countries, it closely 
tracks Brent type crude oil price with a one- to two-month lag (Poten & Partners October 
2010). The correlation between JCC and Brent oil can be seen easily from Figure 16. The 
general formula of LNG price12 in Asia Pacific countries is as follows: 
𝐏(𝐋𝐍𝐆) ($/𝐌𝐁𝐓𝐔) = ∝ +𝛃(𝐉𝐂𝐂) 
Where α and β are constant and JCC is in $/bbl. 
To protect the LNG suppliers and customers, oil-indexed formula was revised but 
these modifications did not prevent the huge price gap among the regions. As shown in 
Figure 16, Asia Pacific countries paid average 16 $/MBtu for the imports of LNG in the 
years between 2011 and 2014, Europe and the US imported LNG with prices of 9 and 3 
$/MBtu respectively.  
As far as the spot LNG market in Asia Pacific is concerned, the LNG prices are 
generally benchmarked with Henry Hub (HH) in the USA and NBP in the UK. 
2.1.5.1.2. Prices in European Countries 
Unlike other regions, LNG has been traded via two different price mechanisms in 
European countries. While the pricing mechanisms in Asia Pacific and Europe (except the 
UK) are based on the market prices of oil/oil products or oil basket as a commodity to 
determine LNG prices, different commodity, natural gas, has been used to indicate LNG 
price in the UK National Balancing Point (NBP). Under this circumstances, when historical 
LNG prices in continental Europe are examined, prices in the UK have been generally 
lower than the prices in other European countries. For example, in February 2013 while 
the LNG price in the UK was 22 Euro/Megawatt-hour (€/MWh), it became 32.7 €/MWh 
in Italy and 36.3 €/MWh in Greece (European Commission 2013).      
                                                 
12 This straight line relationship between the LNG price and JCC was used until late 1980s. And then it was 
modified to mitigate impacts of extreme oil prices on the LNG prices. Now, S-Curve relationship has been 
used to soften impacts of high oil prices. 
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Although the LNG prices in the UK have been determined regarding to balance of 
natural gas supply and demand, in continental Europe the LNG trade has heavily depended 
on long-term contracts in which prices have been indexed to crude oil and oil products. 
Generally, oil/oil product indexed contracts, the prices of gas oil and/or fuel oil are 
considered to estimate LNG prices. Most widely used formula in long-term European 
contracts is: 
𝐏𝐧 = 𝐏𝐨 + 𝐚[𝐀𝐯 𝐏𝐅𝐎(𝐧 − 𝐱, … , 𝐧 − 𝟏)] + 𝐛[𝐀𝐯 𝐏𝐆𝐎(𝐧 − 𝐱, … , 𝐧 − 𝟏)] 
Where a and b are a constant and multiplied by the average of last (x-1) month’s fuel oil 
and gas oil prices respectively and the key variables in this formula change from contract 
to contract and are kept confidential by the parties (Rogers 2010).   
Figure 16 shows the relationship among LNG prices in the natural gas hubs (Henry 
Hub, Cove Point and Lake Charles in the USA; NBP in the UK and BEB in Belgium). 
Luckily the European countries have not paid as much as Asia Pacific countries but they 
still spend more than North American countries during importing LNG. 
Even though majority of the European LNG contracts have been prepared on the 
basis of oil-indexation, the region has increasingly moved towards the hybrid pricing 
system (particularly in the Northwestern part of Europe) (International Gas Union (IGU) 
2014).     
2.1.5.1.3. Prices in North American Countries 
Until mid-1980s, the natural gas markets of North American countries were 
regulated and a significant portion of LNG exports to this region took place under long-
term contracts where prices were either fixed with some provision for escalation over the 
contract life or were linked to prices of substitute energy sources, such as crude oil 
(Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers January 2014). But with the liberalization 
of gas market as a result of the deregulation of the gas markets, the market players moved 
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away from long-term contracts to short term basis contracting mechanism. Transformation 
of the gas markets has led to dominance of gas-on-gas market based pricing (hub pricing) 
system in this region; and LNG like natural gas started to be priced by shifts in supply and 
demand (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) August 2014). During the 
evolution of gas-to-gas pricing mechanism the natural gas prices at Henry Hub (HH) in 
Louisiana have used as a benchmark and LNG prices have estimated according to prices at 
this hub.  
Gas-to-gas pricing mechanism has essential effects on the profitability and risks of 
a project due to the volatility and lower price of pipeline gas and expected high oil price 
(Du and Paltsev November 2014). As a rule of thumb, 1 MBtu of natural gas have 
approximately one-sixth of the energy content of one-barrel crude oil. As far as oil prices 
and the energy content relationship between oil and gas are concerned, average gas prices 
are expected to be 1/6 of the oil prices. But the market dynamics in North American 
countries have been beyond the expectations. The HH natural gas prices have been the 
lowest gas prices among other regions due to the inclusion of cheap and abundant natural 
gas into gas-to-gas mechanism. As a result of sudden increase in gas supply in the US, the 
HH gas prices plummeted compared to the previous periods. To illustrate, regarding the 
data from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the average gas prices in the HH 
in 2014 were between $ 4-5 per MBtu, whereas the same prices in 2008 were about $ 8-9 
per MBtu13. When these prices in 2008 and 2014 are compared with the prices in other 
regions that do not produce shale gas, the prices were $ 11-12/MBtu in Europe and $ 18-
19/MBtu in Asia Pacific in 2008. In 2014, average natural gas prices, considerably higher 
than the HH prices, were $ 8-9/MBtu in Europe and $ 13-14/MBtu in Asia Pacific.     
                                                 
13 Whereas the oil prices were close to each other in 2008 (99.67 $/bbl) and 2014 (93.26 $/bbl), natural gas 
prices were different from each other due to the gas-to-gas pricing mechanism. 
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In the foreseeable future, considerable natural gas production in the US and its 
impacts on the LNG prices in North American natural gas market are anticipated to sustain. 
This production is also expected to make the US a net gas exporter instead of importing 
natural gas from other regions like South America and the Middle East. Consequently, the 
LNG markets in other regions will also be significantly influenced (Zelenovskaya 2012).     
2.1.5.2. Arbitrage in LNG Prices 
Requiring high capital-intensive investment has shaped the global LNG market and 
forced the LNG suppliers to sign a long-term contract to sell their products as a bulk. For 
this reason, only limited amount of LNG has been traded in the spot market. Since the 
1990s an increase in the volume of spot and short-term transactions has provided arbitrage 
opportunities. Arbitrage14 in the LNG market is defined as a physical cargo diversion from 
one market to another, which offers a higher price (Zhuravleva 2009). In the global LNG 
market two types of arbitrage mechanism are used: financial and operational arbitrage. The 
first contains the simultaneous purchase and sale of LNG to benefit from a price difference 
between the markets. As an alternative to financial arbitrage, operational arbitrage includes 
selling LNG cargo to hedge the risk of plant outages, overfull storage tanks or force 
majeure (Holleaux 2006). 
Over the last five years, the price differences between three main regions have 
diversified significantly and prepared the ground for LNG arbitration for especially the 
Middle Eastern countries. For example, as shown in Figure 17, when LNG supplier from 
Qatar sent its cargo to Japanese contract market or the UK, it would have netted back 
$7.16/MBtu or $1.21/MBtu respectively. If this supplier delivered its product to Japanese 
spot market, the added margin would be $9.54/MBtu (Jensen 2011).  
                                                 
14 This trade mechanism is limited to a contract, and it is different from the LNG re-export. 
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Figure 17: Hypothetical LNG netback15 to Qatar assuming 2008 costs and the availability 
of receipt terminal capacity16 at market   
 
Source: Jensen, 2011 
Although arbitrage mechanism provides flexibility and highest netback to the 
suppliers, the structure of the global LNG market restricts frequent utilization of arbitrage 
mechanism due to existence of uncertainties in regional LNG pricing, contractual 
limitations, and technical barriers. In the near future, abundant LNG production as a result 
of entrance of new suppliers to the market is expected to increase arbitrage ability.        
2.2. THE US LNG MARKET 
The United States has one of the largest natural gas markets in the world and 
development of the US LNG market has been different from other countries regarding 
many aspects. Although considerable amount of natural gas was produced in the US, the 
US became the net gas importer at the beginning of the 1960s due to an increase in share 
of natural gas in the US energy mix. After peak gas production in 1973, the natural gas 
                                                 
15 Netback price of LNG at a certain point (i.e. the border or the wellhead) is the comparative value of selling 
LNG to various markets and used to estimate the worth of producing gas. It is calculated by deducting the 
costs associated with getting LNG from certain point to the eventual point of sale from its competitive value 
at that point of sale.  
16 Receipt terminal capacity shows regasification capacity of the LNG terminal. 
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imports became flat in the following 15 years and then started to rise gradually until mid-
2000s.   
Figure 18: Changes in natural gas production, import (pipeline and LNG), export and the 
level of natural gas storage in the US (1979-2013) 
 
 
Source: EIA  
Figure 18 illustrates the balance between natural gas supply and demand in the US 
natural gas market17. Depending on the reduction in indigenous natural gas production, 
natural gas imports have increased. After 2000, they have started to grow. Because of the 
shale gas boom in 2007, whereas natural gas imports have shrunk, natural gas exports have 
risen. 
High oil prices, as well as technological advancement (horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracking) used to extract natural gas from gas reservoirs, have provided 
incentives to emerge the production of shale gas. Since 2010, the US has become the largest 
natural gas producers in the world by being the frontrunner in the shale gas extraction in 
mid-2000s. As a result of the shale gas boom, an increase in domestic gas production has 
                                                 
17 Consumption = Indigenous Production+ Import +Stock changes-Export. In Figure 18, values calculated 
regarding to this formula are different from natural gas consumption due to the statistical deviations.  
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caused a continuous decline in LNG imports, the closure of LNG import plant in Alaska, 
and an increase in US natural gas exports. To illustrate, according to data from the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA), while the US in 2007 imported 19% of its 
natural gas demand, this share dropped to 10% in 2013. The US natural gas exports have 
risen and reached to 6.5% of the US natural gas production in 2013.  
The surge in the shale gas production has led to lower gas prices considerably and 
this reduction has created an encouragement in domestic natural gas demand and 
competition among coal and natural gas for electricity generation; and it has impacted the 
US energy mix and energy independence. As a result of the shale gas production, the share 
of natural gas in total US energy mix changed from 22.9% in 2007 to 26.9% in 2014 
because of utilization of natural gas heavily on electricity generation and industrial sector 
such as metal manufacturing, chemicals and petrochemicals. 
Over the last decade the shale gas revolution has become a game changer in the US 
energy market and now the US is planning to be a significant LNG exporter to sell its 
oversupply gas. As shown in Figure 19, the shale gas production, accounting for nearly 1% 
of US gas production in 1990, is anticipated to rise 53% of total gas production in 2040. 
When the US natural gas consumption is predicted to grow with a CAAGR of 0.74%, the 
US could import 6 Tcf/year in 2040. Expectation of considerable amount of gas supply and 
current low natural gas prices at the HH make the US an attractive natural gas exporter.   
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Figure 19: US Natural gas consumption and production by source between 1990 and 
2040 (Reference Case Scenario) 
 
Source: Annual Energy Outlook (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) May 
2014) 
In addition to excessive amount of natural gas production and comparatively low 
natural gas prices, the existence of extensive infrastructure provides many advantages to 
the US to be a gas exporter in the near future. In the US, existing regasification facilities 
can be utilized as a liquefaction plant by investing small amount of money. For this reason, 
several companies have focused on this type of investment to minimize initial expenditure 
of liquefaction plants.  
Although the shale gas boom has provided many opportunities to the US, some 
requirements, such as retrofitting exiting infrastructure and adapting or amending existing 
regulations, should be fulfilled to realize US LNG exports. In the following part of this 
section, current status of US LNG infrastructure, barriers for US LNG exports and the 
effects of them on both domestic and exogenous energy markets will be discussed.   
2.2.1. The US LNG Infrastructure 
Prior to the revolution of shale gas in the US, significant amount of LNG was 
imported by the US. As a result of a decline in US conventional natural gas production and 
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an increase in US natural gas demand several US LNG import terminals were constructed. 
Table 3 given below shows that 11 existing LNG import terminals in the US with the 
capacity of 18.5 Bcf/d. 
Table 3: Import capacity of existing U.S. LNG terminals18 (As of February 2015) 
Terminal/Location/Operator 
Capacity 
(Billion std. 
m3/day) 
Everett, MA, GDF Suez- DOMAC 29.3 
Cove Point, MD, Dominion-Cove Point LNG 51 
Elba Island, GA, El Paso-Southern LNG 45.3 
Lake Charles, LA, Southern Union-Trunkline LNG  59.5 
Offshore Boston, MA, Excelerate Energy- Northeast Gateway 22.7 
Freeport, TX, Cheniere/Freeport LNG Dev. 42.5 
Sabine, LA, Cheniere/Sabine Pass LNG 113.3 
Hackberry, LA, Sempra-Cameron LNG 51 
Offshore Boston, MA, GDF Suez-Neptune LNG 11.3 
Sabine Pass, TX, ExxonMobil-Golden Pass (Phase I&II) 56.6 
Pascagoula, MS, El Paso/Crest/Sonangol-Gulf LNG Energy LLC 42.5 
Total 523.9 
Source: Data from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
An exponential increase in the shale gas production has altered the decline in US 
natural gas production and reduced the need for importing LNG. Before the shale gas 
boom, total LNG import volume in the US reached to 800 Bcf in 2007 and dropped to only 
100 Bcf in 2013. Some terminals such as Freeport in Texas, Sabine and Hackberry in Los 
Angeles have applied to receive re-export permission.  
Regarding the projection of US natural gas production updated by the US Energy 
Information Administration, US gas extraction will exceed gas demand before 2020 and 6 
Tcf per annum of LNG can be imported by the US in 2040 (U.S. Energy Information 
                                                 
18 Penuelas in Puerto Rico (PR) is not shown in the Table 3 because it cannot serve or affect deliveries in the 
Lower 48 US states. 
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Administration (EIA) May 2014).  Considerable growth in natural gas surplus in the 
foreseeable future has provided some opportunities for new LNG investments. Firstly, 
some investors applied to DOE to retrofit existing LNG regasification terminals generally 
located in the east coast of the US. Table 4 shows the applications to DOE so as to export 
domestically produced LNG to FTA and non-FTA countries. According to this table, total 
capacity of all application is 2,264.5 million m3 (Mcm)/day (80 Bcf/d). 
Table 4: Export capacity of proposed and approved U.S. LNG terminals (As of Dec. 
31, 2014) 
Company Capacity19 (Mcm/day) 
Sabine Pass Liq., LLC 62.3 
Freeport LNG Exp., LP and FLNG Liq., LLC20 90.6 
Lake Charles Exports, LLC 56.6 
Carib Energy (USA), LLC 2 
Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP 50.1 
Jordan Cove Energy Project, LP 56.6 
Cameron LNG, LLC 48.1 
Other Projects 1,898.2 
Total 2,264.5 
Source: Data from U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 It includes the capacity of terminals that were approved to export to both FTA and non-FTA countries. 
20 Freeport LNG Expansion, LP and FLNG Liq., LLC has two different applications approved by both FERC 
and DOE. 
 39 
Figure 20: U.S. LNG liquefaction terminals approved by DOE to export to Non-FTA 
countries (As of Dec. 31, 2014)  
 
 
Source: Data from U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE) 
As of December 31, 2014, 48 applications were submitted to DOE for the rights to 
export LNG to both FTA and non-FTA countries. As shown in Figure 20, only 8 
applications were granted LNG export permits. Among these permits, Sabine  Pass, the 
first bi-directional facility in the world,  is  anticipated  to  initiate  operations in late  2015,  
with  11%  of its export  capacity  serving  the  spot  market,  and  the remaining that will 
be sent to Korea  Gas,  GAIL  India,  and  BG  Group54 under the long-term contracts.   
2.2.2. Barriers for the LNG Export 
Although the LNG export would be very advantageous for the US and the global 
economy, there are several bottlenecks that can impede the realization of US LNG exports 
or cause significant reduction in profitability.  
2.2.2.1. Financial Drawbacks 
The oil prices, main determinants of LNG prices in Asia Pacific and some European 
countries, have been declining steadily since June 2014 because the gap between the LNG 
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prices in the US and these regions has narrowed. As of February 1, 2015, they have fallen 
by nearly 60% and made the LNG trade from the US uneconomic by reducing the US 
competitiveness against traditional sellers, such as Qatar and Australia.  
Plummeting oil price has also threatened to the proposed US liquefaction terminals. 
When considering the requirement of huge capital intensive investment for constructing 
LNG liquefaction terminal, dropping oil prices have been increasing the cancelation risk 
of greenfield LNG projects21 due to the existence of many financial uncertainties. 
Depending on oil prices, plunging oil-linked LNG prices do not support profitable LNG 
exports from the US. To illustrate, in 2015 it is anticipated that the many US greenfield 
projects may be postponed or sold if they cannot attract customers or necessary 
development capital22 (Weems and Hwang 2015).  
In the long-run, dropping natural gas prices will hurt the production of shale gas 
generally used as a feed-gas for LNG production. This reduction may also harm LNG 
investments due to possibility of feed gas scarcity.   
2.2.2.2. Environmental Problems 
Regarding EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014, US natural gas production is 
anticipated to rise from 24.06 Tcf in 2012 to 37.54 Tcf in 2040 by increasing 1.6% 
annually. This long-term growth in natural gas production is expected to come from the 
shale gas development. As far as substantial carbon emissions of the shale gas production 
(i.e. fugitive methane) and the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing like water 
contamination, and also an increase in seismic activities are concerned, the growth in the 
shale gas production will make environmental regulations much stricter.  
                                                 
21 Greenfield LNG projects include the construction of all facility. Unlike greenfield projects, existing LNG 
facility is upgraded in brownfield projects. For this reason, the capital expenditure of the LNG projects varies 
substantially among greenfield and brownfield developments. 
22 Plunging LNG prices cause to decrease high profitability expectations of greenfield projects. 
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For the LNG production, the price of feed-gas is one of the essential parameters to 
expand profitability of LNG trade. Stricter health, safety, and environmental regulations 
will lead to spike in the overall cost of shake gas production and therefore the price of feed 
gas and the amount of exported LNG will inflate. 
2.2.2.3. Current US Policies on the LNG Export 
Under the Natural Gas Act, Department of Energy (DOE)23 was authorized to 
export LNG. Exporting LNG to the countries with which the US has Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) is directly considered in the public interest and the application for exporting LNG 
to such countries are approved without any modification or delay (Bobbish 2014). As of 
February 2015, the US has FTAs with twenty countries: Bahrain, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, 
Jordan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru and Singapore. 
Unlike countries with FTAs, if domestically produced LNG is imported to countries 
without such FTAs, exporting companies should apply to DOE which analyzes the effects 
of LNG exporting process on the public interest regarding indigenous natural gas 
production needs and broader macroeconomic indicators. In this procedure, some flaws 
that harm possible US LNG exports exist. First drawback is opaque parameters of public 
interest. During assessment of an application, DOE has looked to a broad range of factors, 
such as domestic need, domestic natural gas supply, balance of trade and geopolitical 
considerations (Duncan 2015). Existence of some rebuttable presumptions, unfortunately, 
can impact DOE’s final decision and lead to unexpected results.   
Although the US recently has FTAs with twenty countries, certain countries such 
as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China and the EU countries are not in the list. Therefore, 
LNG exports to these countries requires DOE’s approval. 
                                                 
23 DOE regulates LNG as a commodity in international trade. 
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Prior to applying to DOE, companies planning to export LNG should have the 
approval of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)24 to construct or operate 
an LNG terminal since the construction and operation of the LNG terminals have more 
significant impact than the exportation of LNG as a commodity (Brown 2014). Review and 
approval processes by DOE and FERC take between 18 and 30 months25 and cost $100 
million for proposals to export LNG to countries with which the US does not have FTAs 
(Collins 2015). This long approval period has caused to hamper the competitiveness of US 
projects and to rise project cost unexpectedly.  
The other vital hardship is the opposition of indigenous natural gas consumers such 
as Dow Chemical that uses significant quantities of natural gas. Consumers have stressed 
that LNG exports would cause domestic natural gas price spike and hurt the US economy.    
2.2.2.4. Uncertainties in Panama Canal Expansion  
New LNG projects in the US are mainly located to the eastern coast of the US and 
many export projects are relying on transit through the Panama Canal to access Asia Pacific 
countries. The expansion of the canal26 will provide significant amount of time and cost 
savings for the US LNG exporters. But there are some uncertainties on this project. First 
bottleneck is insufficient capacity of the canal even after the expansion. Only six ships of 
any type will be able to enter the canal in each direction in a daily basis (Goncalves 2014). 
According to Wood Mackenzie’s expectations, around 30 million tons of LNG will follow 
to Asia Pacific region via the Panama Canal (Wood Mackenzie 2014). Carrying this 
amount of LNG from Atlantic to Pacific will result in serious congestion in the canal. With 
                                                 
24 FERC reviews applications as National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) agency and regulates the 
design, construction and operation of a facility and its impact on the surrounding environment. 
25 To expedite DOE’s and FERC’s review processes, “LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act” was 
introduced to the 114th Congress. Regarding this regulation, DOE’s approval period will not exceed 45 days 
after the completion of NEPA review.  
26 In spite of the fact that completion of canal expansion project was planned at the end of 2014, the expansion 
of the Panama Canal has not been finalized. The expected date of completion is in January 2016. 
 43 
an increase in tanker traffic in the canal, its physical restriction will most probably elongate 
the transportation period.  
Another key uncertainty is the toll rate applied after the expansion of the canal. 
Recently, Panama Canal Authority proposed toll rate as approximately $700,000 round trip 
for 173,000 m3 ship. Regarding King&Spalding’s estimation, if the proposed toll rate with 
some extra costs is applied, the transportation cost of the LNG carrier from the US to Japan 
is $1.75 per MBtu versus $2.5 per MBtu via the alternative route around the Cape of Good 
Hope (Weems and Hwang 2015).  
In the foreseeable future, the concerns related to cost and congestion impact both 
the US and importing countries. Asia Pacific countries may prefer to import LNG from 
other sources, such as Qatar or Australia. To mitigate negative effects of the Panama Canal, 
the US companies exporting LNG can elect to alternative routes to Asia Pacific countries. 
2.2.3. Impacts of the US LNG Exports 
Regarding EIA projection given in Annual Energy Outlook 2014, US LNG exports 
to both FTA and non-FTA countries have sparked many debates on the benefits of US LNG 
exports not only in the US but also in possible importing countries like the EU members.   
2.2.3.1. Domestic Energy Market 
The US natural gas producers have been very ambitions to take advantage of 
tremendous price differentials between the US and foreign markets. But US LNG exports 
are a double-edged sword for domestic energy market and the US economy. Whereas it 
provides many advantages to the US energy market and economy, it can create some 
undesired problems. 
To estimate the effects of US LNG exports on the US economy, many studies were 
carried out by considering several scenarios. One of the most contentious studies conducted 
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by NERA Economic Consulting27, the private consulting firm, conveys two outcomes. First 
one is that US LNG exports are very sensitive to both internal and external factors (such 
as supplies of LNG from other regions, the global LNG prices, and the cost of producing 
natural gas in the US) that make it hard to predict. Secondly, US LNG exports provide net 
positive macroeconomic takeaways for each scenarios28 (Montgomery and Tuladhar 2013). 
As a conclusion, NERA emphasized that the US would obtain net economic benefits from 
LNG exports and they would increase as the level of LNG exports increased. 
Exporting LNG directly supports thousands of US jobs in engineering, 
manufacturing, construction and operation of the export infrastructure. Depending on an 
increase in the LNG production, the shale gas production will be triggered and this will 
create additional jobs in the upstream part of the gas industry (America's Oil and Natural 
Gas Industry 2014). 
On the other hand, US LNG exports will rise US natural gas wellhead prices in all 
scenarios analyzed by the EIA. In Figure 21 the impacts of US LNG exports on natural gas 
wellhead prices can be seen easily. The pattern of price increases changes according to the 
ultimate level of exports and rate at which increased exports are phased in. While sudden 
rise is observed for “high/rapid” scenario, moderate growth occurs at “low/slow” scenario. 
Price settlement for each scenario is nearly seen after 2030.   
 
 
                                                 
27 The study was first conducted in 2012 and updated in February 2014 to verify and extend the takeaways 
of the previous study. 
28 16 scenarios, which are incorporated different assumptions about US natural gas supply and demand 
outlook and LNG export levels, were analyzed by the NERA. 
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Figure 21: Natural gas wellhead price difference from Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 
2011 Reference Case with different additional export level imposed29  
 
Source: Data from U.S. Energy Information Administration, National Energy Modeling 
System (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2012) 
Although price spike is observed in the short-term period as a result of NERA’s 
optimistic analysis, this increase will be restricted by the global LNG market in the mid- 
and long-term period. When US LNG prices rise, exporting countries will be reluctant to 
purchase US export and this will pressure LNG prices.      
2.2.3.2. The Global Energy Market 
If US LNG exports are realized over the next few years, many importing countries 
as well as the global energy market are benefited in the aspect of geopolitical issues, 
regional LNG prices and GHG emissions (climate change).   
2.2.3.2.1. Geopolitical Benefit 
The US LNG exports can help the US allies especially the countries in Europe and 
Asia Pacific to diversify their energy sources. In the Central and Eastern Europe, countries 
                                                 
29 Scenarios are: low/slow (6 Bcf/d, phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/d per year), low/rapid (6 Bcf/d, phased in at 
a rate of 3 Bcf/d per year), high/slow (12 Bcf/d, phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/d per year) and high/rapid (12 
Bcf/d, phased in at a rate of 3 Bcf/d per year). 
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have heavily depended on natural gas imports from Russia. Utilization of natural gas 
imports as a political weapon by Russia against the EU has harmed the natural gas markets 
both in country and regional bases. The LNG exports from other sources, such as Qatar, 
Algeria and Nigeria, have the EU members allowed to cut their dependence on Russia for 
natural gas. To illustrate, the LNG exports to the EU countries have led to the reduction in 
share of Russian gas from 75% in 1990 down to 34% in 2013 (Cunningham 2013). In 
addition to the diversification of resources, US LNG exports will support the EU countries 
to achieve their 20/20/20 goals to reduce their greenhouse gas emission in the foreseeable 
future. 
Similar to the EU members, key LNG consumers in Asia Pacific, such as Japan and 
South Korea, are interested in the US LNG to improve their energy security and economies 
by importing LNG from the US with a reasonable price.    
2.2.3.2.2. Impacts on the Regional LNG Prices 
After implementing US LNG exports, low natural gas prices in the US have started 
to force main natural gas and the LNG exporters to review their contracts signed with 
importing countries. To illustrate, Russia accepted spot prices for natural gas exports to the 
EU countries instead of oil-linked prices (Cunningham 2013). Initiation of US LNG 
exports will increase pressure on suppliers to re-negotiate their natural gas prices. For this 
reason, in the short-term after starting LNG exports from the US, the LNG prices in Europe 
and Asia Pacific are expected to plunge.  
The other prospective impact of US LNG exports is the formation of more liquid 
LNG market. Depending on the volume of LNG imported via both long-term contracts spot 
prices will reduce. To illustrate, in the study conducted by Deloitte in 2013, impacts of US 
LNG exports on the LNG price in other regions were analyzed; and Deloitte found that a 
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decrease in the rate of price in importing countries would be very fast. This reduction in 
LNG prices will reduce the burden on the economies of the LNG importing countries.   
2.2.3.2.3. Impacts on GHG Emissions 
Although production of natural gas is a controversial because of environmental 
concerns, US LNG exports are believed to have positive effects on the reduction of GHG 
emissions of the developing and developed countries. In foreseeable future, Chinese LNG 
demand is expected to increase rapidly to decrease its GHG emissions. Similar to China30, 
LNG need in Germany is anticipated to rise due to the German plans including the 
replacement of nuclear with natural gas. Lower global LNG prices due to US LNG exports 
will help countries who want to restructure their energy markets to reduce emissions. Under 
these circumstances, US LNG exports will encourage importers to displace dirtier sources 
of energy like coal and crude oil.  
2.3. THE EU LNG MARKET 
The European Union (EU) is a net natural gas-importing region. In 2012 the EU 
imported 66% of natural gas supply (European Commission (EC) 2014). In spite of its high 
import rate, natural gas as an important part of the EU’s energy mix is made up only 24% 
of the EU’s primary energy consumption in 2012. Because of the EU’s stringent policies 
to de-carbonizing its energy system, the EU natural gas demand has increased abruptly 
over the last decade and the EU natural gas market has become the second largest natural 
gas markets after the US natural gas market.  
Continuous increase in natural gas demand in the EU countries has been fulfilled 
by indigenous gas production, natural gas imports and underground storage of natural gas. 
Even though natural gas has been mainly produced by the Netherland, it has not been 
                                                 
30 Although China is thought as a major LNG market for US LNG exports, in the medium to long run, the 
US does not plan to establish FTAs with this country (Hufbauer, Bagnall and Muir 2013).  
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sufficient to feed the EU’s gas glut. To narrow the gap between gas demand and domestic 
gas production well connected pipelines from main natural gas suppliers (Russia, Norway 
and Algeria) with a capacity of 530 Bcm/year have been utilized to import natural gas. In 
addition to pipelines, natural gas has been stored in 130 underground gas storage (UGS) 
facilities with the capacity exceeding 90 Bcm (European Commission (EC) 2014).         
In the supply side, declining gas reserves in the North Sea and the Netherlands, 
increased production costs, and the EU’s desire to diversify the natural gas suppliers (i.e. 
to decrease dependence to Russia) have been strengthening the role of LNG in the EU 
natural gas market since the 2000s. Also, in the demand side, the deregulation of the EU’s 
energy markets and transformation of energy sector especially power generation to the 
utilization of low carbon intensive fuels have supported LNG exports to the EU. Figure 22 
shows the balance between natural gas supply and demand in the EU countries in the period 
between 2003 and 2013. While total domestic natural gas production was 212 Bcm in 2003, 
it plummeted with a rate of 2.7% per year and became 157 Bcm in 2013. Although total 
natural gas demand in the EU grew rapidly between 2003 and 2008, it reached its highest 
amount in 2010. Unfortunately, after 2010 it decreased 9% in 2011 and became flat 
between 2011 and 2013.  
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Figure 22: Natural gas production, imports (net) (pipeline and LNG) and storage 
withdrawal in the EU countries (2003-2013) 
 
Source: Eurogas, Author's Analysis  
Depending on reduction in indigenous production, natural gas imports inflated 
starting from 2003 and the EU dependence on natural gas imports increased to nearly 70% 
most of which is pipeline gas coming from Russia. Over the last decade, natural gas has 
been heavily imported via pipelines and its prices were formed regarding long-term 
contracts varying from 10 to 35 years in the EU countries. But growing tension between 
Ukraine and Russia, which caused natural gas supply disruptions in 2006, 2009 and 2014, 
has made the EU energy security one of the priorities of the European Council. To mitigate 
impacts of high Russian gas prices and Russian political pressure on the EU, alternative 
form of natural gas delivery was started to be discussed by the EU and its allies. To 
illustrate, at the EU-US summit held in March 2014, energy cooperation31, providing 
ground for exchanging energy across the Atlantic, was on the table (De Micco 2014). 
When taking the EU’s massive reliance on pipeline gas into account, additional 
pipeline gas is not seen as a good solution as delivery of LNG via cargo ships to the EU 
                                                 
31 In this summit, the LNG export was shown as a solution for the long-term period. But in the short term it 
was emphasized that the EU countries should make better use of their indigenous resources by lifting 
environmental bans on shale gas and by not phasing out nuclear power plants. 
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from various sources. Despite high LNG prices and the requirement of additional 
infrastructure investment, LNG seems as one of the best options.         
2.3.1. Structure of the EU LNG Market 
Contrary to the US natural gas market, liberalized and operating based on supply 
and demand balance, the EU gas market generally depends on long-term contracts with 
take-or-pay obligations. Also, the EU has a fragmented market structure regarding country-
based policies and markets’ dynamics. While the Central and Eastern European countries 
mainly utilize carbon intensive solid fossil fuels, the northwestern European countries 
(including Italy) prefer to use less carbon intensive fuels like natural gas to achieve the 
20/20/20 targets32. In the northwestern part of Europe, the basics of the market are: growing 
hub-trading (like NBP), liquidity, and spot-based pricing. But this situation is not the same 
in the Central and Eastern Europe with illiquid market and oil-indexed natural gas prices 
(Boersma, et al. October 2014).    
Divergence between country-based energy markets is one of the major challenges 
to function the common energy market, maintain the security of energy supply in the EU 
and to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. For this reason, the EU 
legislations and policies have become very active in the EU natural gas market. 
Three consecutive directives (Directives 1998/30/EC, 2003/55/EC and 
2009/72/EC) gradually created a common framework for liberalizing the EU gas market, 
based on the general EU rules and promoting competition (Goldthau 2013). In these 
directives third-party access33 to gas infrastructure (such as LNG receiving terminals) was 
regulated to provide fair, transparent and non-discriminatory gas market (King & Spalding 
                                                 
32 These targets have three objectives: reducing the EU GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 20 percent, 
raising the share of the EU energy consumption produced from renewable energy sources to 20% and 
improving the EU’s energy efficiency by 20 percent by 2020 (Goldthau 2013).  
33 Adaptation of third-party access to LNG receiving terminals varies from member to member. To comply 
with the EU regulations different approaches were utilized by the member countries. 
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2006). Liberalized EU natural gas market by the directives has triggered greenfield LNG 
investments in the EU countries and the utilization of arbitrage process by the LNG seller 
and buyer.  
In addition to three-directive package, some vital policy measures were taken to 
stimulate and financially support the development or establishment of trans-European 
energy infrastructure. These measures became very helpful to the EU natural gas market 
to be more efficient and more resilient in the face of a potential supply disruption. 
Regarding the data from Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) total 15 new LNG regasification 
facilities with the capacity of 92.2 Bcm/year were added and 7 terminals were under 
construction between 1998 and 201434. 
In the EU market nine natural gas hubs are operated. Regarding to data from 
International Gas Union (IGU), after structural transformation in the EU natural gas market 
by the EU policies, gas-on gas competition rose from 15% in 2005 to 45% in 2012 and oil-
indexed pricing mechanism plunged from 78% to 50%. As a result of reduction in oil-
indexed pricing market liquidity also escalated (Institute of Energy for South-East Europe 
(IENE) July 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 In this period the EU LNG regasification capacity has doubled. As of February 2015, the EU’s total 
regasification capacity was 192.2 Bcm/year.  
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Table 5: The EU natural gas hubs 
Physical Hubs35 Country Hub Type 
Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) Austria Transit36 
Zeebrugge (ZEE) Belgium Transit 
Virtual Hubs37 Country Hub Type 
GasPool Germany Transition38 
National Balancing Point (NBP)  United Kingdom Trading39 
Net Connect Germany (NCG)  Germany Transition 
Points d’Echange Nord (PEGS) France Transition 
Points d’Echange Sud (TIGF) France Transition 
Punto Di Scambio Virtuale (PSV) Italy Transition 
Tile Transfer Facility (TTF) Netherlands Trading 
Source: Data from Institute of Energy for South-East Europe (IENE) 
Table 5 illustrates the physical and virtual natural gas hubs in the EU members. 
Whereas natural gas is physically traded at only two points (ZEE and CEGH), natural gas 
is solely traded financially at the others.   
2.3.2. The EU LNG Trade 
The European Union with 28 member countries has fulfilled 23% of its primary 
energy needs from natural gas. Total EU natural gas demand has been facilitated by 
primarily natural gas imports via pipelines or the imports of LNG (see Figure 22) due to 
reduction in domestic natural gas production. For this reason, the natural gas market in the 
EU countries has been characterized by depleting indigenous resources and growing 
dependence on natural gas imports. Whereas considerable amount of natural gas (more 
than 80% of total import) has been imported via pipelines, rest has been supplied from 
various LNG exporting countries, such as Algeria and Nigeria. 
                                                 
35 Physical hub (actual transit location) is a point at which several pipelines intersect. 
36 Transit physical hub is a point at which natural gas is physically traded.   
37 Virtual (balancing) point is a trading platform for financial trading of natural gas.  
38 At transition virtual point, trading environment is immature but benchmark prices are set in national natural 
gas market.  
39 Trading virtual point is a mature hub that let the participants to manage their gas portfolios.  
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Although the share of LNG in the total EU natural gas supply40 (averagely 11%) 
has not been so high, LNG has gained importance especially after dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine in 2009. It has been traded by Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Netherland, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK to feed the EU’s natural gas market. As illustrated in Figure 
23, LNG was generally traded by Spain, France and the UK between 2003 and 2013. 
According to data from International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL), 
the LNG providers to the EU countries are Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Trinidad 
& Tobago, Qatar and Yemen.  
Figure 23: The EU’s LNG import volumes (2003-2013) 
 
Source: GIIGNL and EIA, Author's Analysis  
After 2011 in which the EU LNG imports reached at its highest volume (82 Bcm), 
it declined abruptly in the following years due to economic stagnation, imports of cheap 
coal from the US, higher generation level from renewables, and the divergence between 
pipeline gas and spot LNG prices. In addition to the volume reduction in the LNG imports, 
only small portion of imported LNG was consumed and the remaining part was re-exported 
                                                 
40 Between 2003 and 2013 this share changed from 7.2% (in 2004) to 17.4% (in 2011) depending on weather 
condition, LNG spot prices and problems related to suppliers, such as supply disruption.  
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especially to the Asia-Pacific countries. To illustrate, 41.4 Bcm of LNG were imported in 
2013 but only 13.1 Bcm of LNG were consumed by the EU countries. The residual part 
was traded again.     
The European LNG re-export has been directly related to regional LNG prices and 
importing countries’ approach to long-term contracts. As a result of huge gap between the 
LNG prices in Europe and Asia Pacific region, LNG re-export to Asia Pacific countries 
becomes attractive. The other essential market for Europe reloads is Latin America. Latin 
American countries have generally been reluctant to enter long-term contracts and relied 
on the spot LNG trade (Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide 2015).      
In addition to the LNG re-export to Latin America and Asia Pacific, LNG is 
delivered within the European countries because of the short distance advantage that makes 
the LNG prices more competitive. But the volume of LNG reload within Europe is very 
limited with respect to the LNG re-export to Asia Pacific or Latin America.  
Figure 24: The EU and Turkey LNG demand outlook to 2025 (Million tonnes per annum 
(Mtpa))  
 
Source: CERA Global Redesign (Bonhomme, et al. 2013) 
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Although the EU’s LNG market has got smaller since 2012, it is expected that LNG 
trade will expand after 2015 due to plummeting natural gas prices. Figure 24 shows the 
EU’s LNG demand from 2010 and 2025. Regarding CERA’s prediction, the EU LNG 
market with Turkey will grow with CAAGR of 5.1% per year and it will access to 90 
million tons in 2025. Considerable rises in the LNG imports in Spain, France and Turkey 
are anticipated as the main reason of the EU’s LNG market development.    
2.3.3. The EU Liquefaction and Regasification Terminals 
Liquefied natural gas is seen as an alternative fuel to pipeline gas to strengthen the 
EU’s hand against particularly Russia. For this reason, many regasification terminals were 
constructed all around the Europe.  
Figure 25: Existing and planned LNG regasification terminals in Europe 
 
Source: GIIGNL (2014) and Author’s Analysis 
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Country’s geographical situation, capacity of the LNG terminals, natural gas 
demand and downstream market development mainly affect the role of the regasification 
terminals in the natural gas market. As shown in Figure 25, 21 regasification terminals 
(excluding Turkey) were on stream as of Jan. 2014 and seven terminals with a capacity of 
35 Bcm were under-construction. Total capacity of existing terminals were 190 Bcm. 32 
LNG terminals with more than 160-Bcm capacity was planned to be constructed (Renier 
2013). Regarding terminals that are under-construction and planned to be built, continuous 
capacity expansion is expected. As shown in Figure 26, abrupt development in 
regasification capacity is anticipated in the years between 2015 and 2018. In 2018, total 
regasification capacity is predicted to be 280 million tons per year. 
Figure 26: The European LNG regasification capacities vs. demand outlook to 2020 
(Mtpa)  
 
Source: CERA and PFC Energy Inc. (Bonhomme, et al. 2013) 
When considering total delivery of LNG in 2014 (given in Figure 24) and total 
regasification capacity, it can be seen easily the low utilization rate of regasification 
terminals (around 20%) due to mainly economic stagnation and long-term contracts.  
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In foreseeable future natural gas demand in the EU is forecasted to experience a 
limited growth (0.1-0.2% per year between 2010 and 2030). The present economic 
slowdown, gas-coal competition, and the generation of electricity with increasing rate of 
renewables are expected to limit natural gas demand (Bonhomme, et al. 2013). Competitive 
Russian pipeline gas prices as well as economic stagnation will put considerable pressure 
on the LNG imports. For these reasons, spare regasification capacity is anticipated to be 
considerably high (this gap is predicted to be 200 million tons according to Figure 26) vis-
à-vis the EU’s natural gas demand.  
Although limited amount of natural gas is produced by few EU members, these 
countries import natural gas in a gaseous form. For this reason, there is no liquefaction 
plant in the EU members. In Europe there is only one liquefaction plant located in Norway 
(Snohvit), not the member of the EU.
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Chapter 3: Method 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the methods that will be used to analyze 
impacts of US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market. Measuring impacts on natural 
gas market is a complex task because of many uncertainties, such as natural gas prices.  
In this study, security supply and economic impact analyses are carried out to 
determine the correctness of the null hypothesis (H0).  
3.1. SECURITY SUPPLY ANALYSIS 
Security of energy supply -defined by the IEA as an uninterruptible supply of 
energy at a price which is affordable, while respecting environment concerns- is a multi-
dimensional concept with four main dimensions (the 4 A’s): availability (related to 
physical existence of energy resources), accessibility (regarding geopolitical barriers), 
acceptability41 (including environmental and safety concerns) and affordability (related to 
cost of energy resources).  
According to studies carried out scholars and several energy-related organizations 
many simple and aggregated indicators have been used to estimate the energy security. 
These indicators given in Table 6 can be categorized into nine groups to calculate the 
security of natural gas supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 This parameter is usually taken into account by policymakers as constraints and generally is not seen as 
one of the primary goals of energy security.   
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Table 6: Indicators for natural gas security of supply 
Group Indicators 
Macro-economic 
indicators 
Energy intensity, consumption/capita, import bill indicator 
etc. 
Energy balance indicators Production, imports, exports, transformation, conversion 
loss, distribution loss, energy industry use, final 
consumption etc. 
Reserves indicators Indigenous production, proven gas reserves etc. 
Sectorial indicators Residential, industrial, power generation etc. 
Diversification indicators Sources, suppliers, routes etc. 
Import risk indicators Import dependency, supplier shares and country risks 
Infrastructure indicators Storage, LNG terminal, interconnection pipelines 
Energy crisis indicators Storage flexibility, LNG flexibility, fuel switching 
flexibility etc. 
Gas flow model indicators Gas supply margins, pipeline use etc. 
Source: Badea 2010 
Estimation of security supply for both short- and long-term is very essential. While 
long-term energy security mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in the 
line with economic developments and sustainable environmental needs (International 
Energy Agency (IEA) 2015), short-term energy security42 indicates the ability of market 
fundamentals to react urgently to abrupt alterations with-in the supply-demand balance. 
Although US LNG exports affect both short- and long-term security supply in the EU 
natural gas market, matching the maximum supply (indigenous gas production and import 
capacity) and the expected demand is very complicated due to a considerable swing in 
natural gas demand between the summer and winter months in the EU countries (Lajtai, 
Czinkos and Dinh 2009), and this uncertainty is related to the storage capacity that provides 
flexibility in the market. Under these circumstances, in this study, estimation of security 
supply can be made only for long-term. 
                                                 
42 Regarding the IEA, short-term security supply is defined as hourly or daily security of energy supply. 
Therefore, measures such as withdrawal of natural gas from underground gas storage facilities, fuel switch 
and instantaneous demand reduction are seen as a solution to mitigate impacts of supply disruption.  
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Energy balance and diversification indicators are very helpful to measure long-term 
security supply. Supply-demand balance in the EU natural gas market can be calculated by 
using four parameters of market: forecasted indigenous natural gas production, import 
capacity of pipeline gas based on existing contracts, forecasted natural gas demand and 
possible import capacity of LNG.  
In the second part of this analysis, diversity indicators, market concentration of 
natural gas suppliers and Shannon-Wiener-Neumann (SWN) index, are quantified to 
estimate long-term security of supply.   
3.1.1. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a statistical measure of concentration, is used 
to measure market concentration of gas suppliers in the EU gas market. HHI is important 
to estimate the degree of market competitiveness. It focuses on characteristics of energy 
suppliers and availability of the fuel supply in the supplier country, so the market share of 
each supplier is taken into account to calculate HHI. 
𝐇𝐇𝐈 =  ∑ (𝐒𝐧)
𝟐
𝐧     (Eq. 1) 
where Sn is the market share of firm where n=1, 2,.., n 
The HHI reaches a maximum value of 10,000 if a monopoly or one firm with 100% 
of market share exists. HHI moves from 10,000 to 0 if firms have a small portion of market 
share.  
Although different approaches exist to define the structure of markets, markets are 
commonly classified as; “unconcentrated” if HHI<1,500, “moderately concentrated” if 
1,500<HHI<2,500 and “highly concentrated” if HHI>2,500.  
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3.1.2. Shannon-Wiener Index (SWI) 
Shannon-Wiener Index measures import supply diversification by considering both 
the number of natural gas suppliers and their market shares (Von Hirschausen, et al. 2010). 
The Shannon-Weiner function43 is: 
𝐒𝐖𝐈 = − ∑ 𝐱𝐢 𝐥𝐧 𝐱𝐢𝐢   (Eq. 2) 
Where xi is the fraction share of the imports from supplier i. When natural gas is provided 
from only a supplier (i.e. complete dependence on a single importer), SWI becomes zero. 
The index escalates as the number of suppliers rises. Therefore, lower the SWI is, worse 
degree of diversification in the market is.  
  Although SWI is used to assess the diversification level of the market, it is 
insufficient to represent the structure of the market. Because political stability in exporting 
countries and indigenous production are the other vital determinants for the security of 
energy supply. To estimate the impacts of domestic gas production and supplier reliabilities 
on supply diversification Shannon-Wiener Index was adjusted and two distinct indicators 
have been defined. 
The SWI formula is adjusted by including long-term socio-political stability in 
regions of origin that is one of the main reasons causing supply disruption. For example, 
one of the main gas suppliers to EU countries, Russia, has a political stability index of 0.22 
and this decreases the reliability of this country in the eyes of gas importers. Although 
political stability of exporting countries is considered as an essential parameter for the 
security of energy supply, the political stability in the “home” region is not an issue (Jansen, 
Van Arkel and Boots 2004). When long-term political stability in regions of origin is taken 
into consideration, modified SWI, called as Shannon-Wiener-Neumann 1 index (SWN-1 
or SWN 1), is formulized as: 
                                                 
43 The formula of SWI consists of negative sign to ensure positivity of the index. 
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𝐒𝐖𝐍 𝟏 = − ∑ 𝐱𝐢(𝐥𝐧 𝐱𝐢)𝐛𝐢𝐢   (Eq. 3) 
Where xi: Market share of supplier i 
bi: Index of political stability of country i, ranging from 0 to 1 where a high index 
represents high political stability. For this reason, SWN-1 is lower than the SWI if the 
energy source is imported from unstable regions.   
SWI is further extended to include indigenous production as well, to the so-called 
Shannon-Wiener-Neumann 2 (SWN-2 or SWN 2) index (Dresden University of 
Technology (TUD) 2008). By estimation of SWN-2, the shortcoming of SWN-1 is 
eliminated. To illustrate, when importing country with only one supplier has high share 
of indigenous production in the whole supply, SWN-1 is calculated zero although its 
security of energy supply is very high. Adjustment of SWI by taking into account the share 
of domestic production helps to reflect exact situation of the energy market.       
𝐒𝐖𝐍 𝟐 = − ∑ 𝐱𝐢(𝐥𝐧 𝐱𝐢)𝐛𝐢(𝟏 + 𝐠𝐢)𝐢   (Eq. 4) 
Where xi: Market share of supplier i 
bi: Index of political stability of supplier i 
gi: The share of indigenous production in the total consumption  
Generally, the relationship among three indices are SWI>SWN-1>SWN-2.  
To sum, the higher value of indices shows better supply security. The difference 
between the indices indicates the effects of parameters (political stability and the share of 
indigenous production in the total energy supply) on the market.    
3.2. ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Potential impacts of US LNG exports are expected not to be limited to the security 
of energy supply. It will also affect natural gas consumers economically. Entrance of the 
US as a new supplier to the EU natural gas market with low gas prices compared to the 
prices of other suppliers is anticipated to strengthen the EU’s bargaining position, to 
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compel other suppliers to re-negotiate long-term contracts and lower natural gas prices. 
These prospective advantages may finally trigger the EU natural gas demand.  
Estimation of economic impacts of the US natural gas exports on the EU gas market 
is very challenging task because of the existence of many uncertainties. Natural gas market 
is very dynamic and many parameters such as harsh weather conditions, EU’s economic 
situation and some exogenous events may lead to unexpected price change and demand 
jump.  
Forecasting natural gas prices in the EU market is a challenging issue because 
natural gas import heavily depends on long-term contracts. Also, natural gas prices are 
generally linked to highly volatile oil prices. During importing LNG from the US, the main 
determinant of natural gas prices will be US natural gas prices that are formed regarding to 
the Henry Hub Price, liquefaction, regasification and shipping costs, so these components 
will be used to forecast the EU natural gas prices empirically. 
After predicting EU natural gas prices for the period between 2015 and 2030, the 
EU natural gas demand will be estimated via the formula given in the analysis44 performed 
by O. Dilaver and her colleagues (Dilaver, Dilaver and Hunt 2014). In the literature on 
natural gas demand projections, there are several econometric models with various 
approaches such as bottom-up45 or survey-based approaches.  
In the following part of this section, the approach used to predict EU natural gas 
price in the years from 2015 to 2030 is defined. Secondly, the method and the formula 
obtained from it will be explained. 
                                                 
44 The aim of this study is to show the impacts of natural price change on the EU’s natural gas demand by 
using the relationship between natural gas price and demand. 
45 Bottom-up approach aims to forecast EU natural gas demand by breaking up EU’s natural gas demand 
into smaller units and then estimating the aggregates of demand. To illustrate, EU’s natural gas demand was 
predicted from natural gas consumption of sectors such as the power and non-power sectors in the EU 
countries.  
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3.2.1. Predicting European Natural Gas Prices 
When US LNG exports with lower LNG prices are initialized, the LNG prices in 
the US and the EU countries are expected to converge to each other. For this reason, the 
LNG prices in the EU countries are anticipated to decrease until the LNG prices in the EU 
countries are equal or close to the US LNG prices that are the combination of the natural 
gas price at Henry Hub, liquefaction, regasification and shipping costs. 
When considering the dependence of the EU countries on pipeline gas, the 
reduction of the LNG prices in the EU countries will also affect the prices of pipeline 
natural gas primarily imported from Russia. For these reasons, the average price of 
imported natural gas in the EU countries will decrease. 
To predict average price of natural gas in the EU countries, the formula given below 
will be used: 
(𝐏𝐚𝐯)𝐭 = 𝐗𝐭 ∗ (𝐏𝐩𝐢𝐩𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐠𝐚𝐬)𝐭 +  (𝟏 − 𝐗𝐭) ∗ (𝐏𝐋𝐍𝐆)𝐭  (Eq. 5) 
Where  (Pav)t : Average price of imported natural gas at year t in $/MBtu 
(Ppipeline gas)t: Average price of imported pipeline natural gas at year t in $/MBtu 
(PLNG)t: Average price of imported LNG at year t in $/MBtu 
Xt: The share of pipeline gas in the total natural gas import at year t  
As mentioned before, LNG prices will converge in the US and the EU countries as 
a result of the LNG export from the US. Therefore, LNG prices will be estimated: 
(𝐏𝐋𝐍𝐆)𝐭 = (𝐏𝐇𝐞𝐧𝐫𝐲 𝐇𝐮𝐛)𝐭 + (𝐏𝐋𝐢𝐪uefaction)𝐭 + (𝐏𝐒𝐡𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐠)𝐭 + (𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧)𝐭 (Eq. 6) 
Where  (PLNG)t : Average price of LNG at year t in $/MBtu 
(PHenry Hub)t: Average price of natural gas at Henry Hub at year t in $/MBtu 
(PLiquefaction)t: Average cost of liquefaction process at year t in $/MBtu 
(PShipping)t: Average shipping cost from the US to the EU countries at year t in 
$/MBtu 
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(PRegasification)t: Average cost of regasification process at year t in $/MBtu 
Figure 27 plotted regarding Eq. 6 will be used to estimate LNG prices at year t. 
Figure 27: The Price of LNG46 exported from the US to the EU countries  
 
Source: Cheniere Energy data (Henderson 2012)  
3.2.2. Projection of European Natural Gas Demand 
In the analysis performed by O. Dilaver and her colleagues, European natural gas 
demand (OECD-Europe) is projected by means of the Structural Time Series Model 
(STSM) with the Underlying Energy Demand Trend (UEDT) concept. Although many 
models used by Eurogas and International Energy Agency (IEA) are based on the 
disaggregate forecast approach, demand in the STSM is predicted via the aggregate 
approach. 
Energy demand is traditionally formulized as a function of economic activity and 
the energy prices. But many exogenous unobservable factors (such as technological 
progress, consumer tastes, preferences, demographic and social structure, environmental 
regulations and economic structure), as well as income, the price of energy sources, affect 
                                                 
46 The prices given in Figure 27 are estimated by only using the natural gas prices at Henry Hub, liquefaction, 
regasification and shipping costs and they do not include profit.  
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the natural gas demand. When these unobservable drivers are ignored or assumed as 
changing linearly during modelling the energy demand, the forecasted demand becomes 
poor. It is, therefore, important to take these unobservable factors into account. To 
overcome this shortcoming, a stochastic UEDT, which allows for the inclusion of all 
unobservable factors into the model, is used in the prediction of the natural gas demand. 
This parameter significantly represents non-linear changes in exogenous unobservable 
factors.  
While the UEDT provides flexibility in reflecting the trend and the seasonality of 
unobservable parameters on the energy demand, the structural time series model (STSM) 
allows for the estimation of a non-linear UEDT (Hunt and Ninomiya 2003). By benefiting 
from the advantages of the STSM and the UEDT, OECD-Europe natural gas demand is 
formulized by (Dilaver, Dilaver and Hunt 2014) as follows:  
𝐆𝐭 = 𝐟(𝐘𝐭 , 𝐏𝐭, 𝐔𝐄𝐃𝐓𝐭)  (Eq. 7) 
Where  Gt : Natural gas demand at year t in Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
Yt: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at year t (US Dollar 2005= 100 PPP) 
Pt: Natural gas price index at year t (2005=100) 
UEDTt: Underlying Energy Demand Trend for natural gas at year t 
In the light of abovementioned definition of the parameters, the relationship 
between the natural gas demand and GDP, price and unobservable factors is explained as: 
𝐀(𝐋) ∗ 𝐥𝐧(𝐆𝐭) = 𝐁(𝐋) ∗ 𝐥𝐧(𝐘𝐭) + 𝐂(𝐋) ∗ 𝐥𝐧(𝐏𝐭) + 𝐔𝐄𝐃𝐓𝐭 + 𝛆𝐭  (Eq. 8) 
Where  A(L)47, B(L)48 and C(L)49 : Polynomial lag operators 
B(L)/A(L): The long run income elasticity of natural gas demand 
C(L)/A(L): The long run price elasticity of natural gas demand 
                                                 
47 𝐴(𝐿) = 1 − 𝜆1𝐿 − 𝜆2𝐿
2 − 𝜆3𝐿
3 − 𝜆4𝐿
4 
48 𝐵(𝐿) = 1 − 𝜑1𝐿 − 𝜑2𝐿
2 − 𝜑3𝐿
3 − 𝜑4𝐿
4 
49 𝐶(𝐿) = 1 − 𝜎1𝐿 − 𝜎2𝐿
2 − 𝜎3𝐿
3 − 𝜎4𝐿
4 
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εt : A random error term 
UEDTt: Stochastic and estimated by STSM via below formula 
𝐔𝐄𝐃𝐓𝐭 = 𝛍𝐭 + irregular interventions + level interventions + slope interventions 
(Eq. 9) 
Where  μt 50: Level of the UEDT at year t 
By using Eq. 8 and 9, the natural gas demand is forecasted via annual change in 
natural gas demand:  
𝚫𝐠𝐭̂ =  𝐊?̂?𝚫𝐲𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐊?̂?𝚫𝐩𝐭−𝟏+ 𝚫𝐔𝐄𝐃𝐓𝐭̂   (Eq. 10) 
Where  KŶ and KP̂ : Estimated coefficients 
ΔUEDTt̂ : Estimated UEDT 
To calculate coefficients (KŶ and KP̂), the natural gas prices and GDP values of 
OECD-Europe countries from 1978 and 2011 were used by scholars (Dilaver, Dilaver and 
Hunt 2014) and the natural gas demand was formulized as follows: 
𝚫𝐠𝐭̂ =  𝟏. 𝟏𝟖𝟗𝟔𝟒 ∗ 𝚫𝐲𝐭−𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓𝟗𝟑𝟔 ∗ 𝚫𝐩𝐭−𝟏+ 𝚫𝐔𝐄𝐃𝐓𝐭̂   (Eq. 11) 
Where  gt : The natural logarithm of natural gas demand at year t 
yt: The natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at year t (US Dollar 
2005= 100 PPP) 
pt: The natural logarithm of natural gas price index at year t (2005=100) 
UEDTt: Underlying Energy Demand Trend for natural gas at year t 
In Eq. 11, ΔUEDTt̂  is projected as -0.0015, -0.0020 and -0.0025 for the low, 
reference and high scenarios in the years between 2012 and 2020. While the growth in 
                                                 
50 μt = μt−1 + βt−1+ηt ;    ηt ∼ NID(0, ση
2) Where ση
2: is estimated by using the software package STAMP 
8.10 
βt = βt−1+ξt ;    ξt ∼ NID(0, σξ
2) Where βt: slope of the UEDT and σξ
2: estimated by using the software 
package STAMP 8.10 
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GDP is taken as 2%, 1% and 2.5% for reference, low and high scenarios respectively, the 
increase in the natural gas price is forecasted as 2%, 2% and 0.5% for these scenarios.  
In this study, the natural gas demand in the EU countries will be projected by using 
Eq. 11. After estimating the natural gas demand, a correction factor, 0.9151, is used to 
convert projected natural gas demand of OECD-Europe countries to the demand of the EU 
countries.   
                                                 
51 OECD-Europe countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,   Finland,   France,   
Germany,   Greece,   Hungary,   Iceland,   Ireland,   Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. To estimate 
the natural gas demand in the EU countries, the natural gas demand in Turkey, Norway and Switzerland 
should be discarded and the demand in Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania 
should be added to the forecasted natural gas demand. In the light of this approach, multiplying projected 
OECD-Europe’s demand by 0.91 is sufficient to determine the demand of the EU countries.  
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Chapter 4: Effects of the US LNG Exports on the EU Natural Gas 
Market 
The security of the EU gas supply has become a priority for the EU members since 
Russia cut off natural gas deliveries to Ukraine in 2006, 2009 and 2014. To mitigate the 
effects of prospective natural gas disruption the European Commission (EC) released 
“European Energy Security Strategy” (COM/2014/0330) in May 2014. In this regulation 
eight key pillars, including concrete actions that need be taken in short, medium and longer 
terms, were determined. In the natural gas supply side, more effective use of the 
opportunities to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the EU member countries is shown 
as a major possible solution of diversification (European Union (EU) 2014).  
The European Union, as well as the US, believes that the LNG trade from the US 
to the European member countries will decrease the EU’s dependence on Russian gas and 
be the game changer in the EU’s natural gas market. Although existence of many 
uncertainties makes this thought harder to prove, the impacts of US LNG exports on the 
EU natural gas market can be analyzed by measuring EU’s security of natural gas supply.   
4.1. ASSUMPTIONS 
This section outlines the assumptions used in the security supply and the economic 
impact analyses. 
4.1.1. Security Supply Analysis 
Three scenarios are implemented: reference, low case and high case scenarios in 
this analysis. In all scenarios, it is assumed that;  
- Indigenous production in the EU countries will decrease 1%, 2% and 1.6% annually over 
the periods: 2015-2020, 2020-2025 and 2025-2030 respectively.  
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- Only existing pipeline infrastructure is assumed to be used in between 2015-2030. In 
other words, total capacity of pipeline transporting natural gas from exporting countries 
will not change throughout these years.  
- Regarding “take-or-pay” obligation, 70% of the gas capacity delivered by Russia under 
the long term contract is assumed to be purchased by the EU countries. 
- According to Eurogas assumptions52, the compounded average annual growth rate 
(CAAGR) is taken as 0.6% to estimate the EU natural gas demand in between 2015 and 
2030. 
- To determine amount of LNG that is required to fulfill the gap between the natural gas 
demand and indigenous natural gas production, projected natural gas exports by the 
exporting countries are given Table 7.    
Table 7: Projected gas imports to the EU countries by the exporting countries (Bcm)  
 2015 2020 2030 
Pipeline 
Gas 
LNG 
Pipeline 
Gas 
LNG 
Pipeline 
Gas 
LNG 
Algeria 28.0 16.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 38.0 
Azerbaijan 0.7 0 10.0 0 15.0 0 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 3.0 
Libya  8.0 0 10.0 0 15.0 6.0 
Norway 109.0 110.0 100.0 
Other53 0 <1 0 <1 0 15-1854 
Qatar 17.3 20.4 22.0 
Russia 130.0 119.0 76.0 
Trinidad&Tobago 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Source: Dickel, et al. 2014, Mitrova 2014, Duval 2011 and Author’s estimations 
                                                 
52 According to Eurogas data the growth rate of natural gas demand is defined as 0.045%, 1.15% and 0.53% 
over the periods 2011-2020, 2020-2025, and 2025-2030, respectively. By using these rates CAAGR is 
calculated as 0.6% by the author.   
53 Other includes imports from Israel, Cyprus and Yemen. 
54 During calculation of the indices, this value is taken as 15 Bcm.  
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The LNG demand of the EU countries over the period 2015-2030 is estimated by 
using Eq. 12. 
𝐋𝐍𝐆𝐭 = 𝐃𝐭 − 𝐐𝐭 − 𝐈𝐭  (Eq. 12) 
Where  LNGt : Projected LNG demand at year t in Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
Dt: Total natural gas demand at year t in Billion m
3 (Bcm)  
Qt: Indigenous natural gas production at year t in Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
It: Amount of imported natural gas purchased under long term contract at year t in 
Billion m3 (Bcm) 
Stability indexes used to calculate of Shannon-Wiener-Neumann 1 index (SWN 1) 
are illustrated in the following table (Table 8). 
Table 8: Political Stability Index (PSI) of the exporting countries to the EU countries 
Exporting Countries55 PSI56 
Algeria 0.08 
Azerbaijan 0.25 
Egypt 0.06 
Libya 0 
Nigeria 0.02 
Norway 0.96 
Oman 0.68 
Other57 0.01-0.73 
Peru 0.2 
Qatar 0.94 
Russia 0.22 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.58 
The US 0.74 
Source: Cornell University, INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) 2014 
                                                 
55 Political stability indices of some countries such as Libya are not estimated by Cornell University, 
INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Hence, this type of indices is assumed 
as zero during calculating SWIs.  
56 The political stability index is between 0 and 1. The higher the index is, the more stabile the country is.  
57 The political stability indices of Israel, Cyprus and Yemen are 0.17, 0.73 and 0.01 respectively. 
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US LNG exports to EU countries are anticipated to initiate at the end of 2015. For 
this reason, HHI, SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 indices are calculated over the period 2016-2030. 
In this study, six scenarios, four of which were specified in the EIA’s 2011 Annual 
Energy Outlook, will be analyzed to measure impacts of US LNG exports to the EU 
countries. These scenarios58 are: 
 No export case (base scenario), 
 6 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/day), phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/day per year 
(low/slow scenario), 
 6 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 3 Bcf/day per year (low/rapid scenario), 
 12 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/day per year (high/slow scenario), 
 12 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 3 Bcf/day per year (high/rapid scenario), 
 Adjustable LNG export (flexible scenario). 
4.1.2. Economic Impact Analysis  
In the economic impact analysis, the formula (given in Eq. 11) used to calculate the 
change in natural gas demand over the period 2015-2030 consists of several parameters. 
The first parameter, natural gas prices, are estimated by assuming that price formation in 
the OECD-Europe countries and the EU countries is based on the volume-weighted 
average prices. While the shares of pipeline gas and LNG in the natural gas market are 
estimated regarding IEA and EIA data for the years between 2000 and 2013, these shares 
over period 2014 and 2030 are assumed as 90% for pipeline gas and 10% for LNG. The 
LNG prices for the period between 2014 and 2030 are estimated by assuming that the prices 
of exported LNG in this time span will be equal to US prices calculated by using Eq. 6 and 
Figure 27. While the regasification and the shipping costs of LNG, and the cost of the 
liquefaction of natural gas are assumed as constant between 2014 and 2030, the HH price 
                                                 
58 To convert daily LNG export rate into annual rate one year is taken as 330 days.   
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will increase according to the scenarios described in the low (2%), reference (1.5%) and 
high scenarios (0.5%) described in Section 3.2.1. 
US LNG exports are expected to lead to an increase in EU natural gas demand due 
to natural gas price drop. To measure the growth in EU natural gas demand, the natural gas 
demands of the OECD-Europe countries in the years from 2000 to 2013 were calculated 
by using EU’s annual natural gas consumption59 gathered from Eurogas reports, and the 
natural gas consumptions of non-EU countries such as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey 
from EIA.   
Regarding the Eurogas’s report, the expected growth rates of natural gas demands 
illustrated in Table 9 were defined as: 
Table 9: Expected growth rate of the natural gas demand over period 2011-2035 
Period Growth Rate (%) 
2011-2020 0.045 
2020-2025 1.150 
2025-2030 0.530 
2030-2035 0.630 
Source: Eurogas  
Data related to the gross domestic product (GDP60) are gathered from Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Three different expected growth 
rates have been used in the model defined by Dilaver, Dilaver and Hunt so as to estimate 
GDP for the years between 2014 and 2030. These rates are 1%, 2% and 2.5% for the low, 
reference and high scenarios, respectively.  
                                                 
59 The EU natural gas demand includes the natural gas consumption of the non-OECD-Europe countries such 
as Bulgaria, Malta, Cyprus, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania. Hence, their natural gas usage were discarded 
and the natural gas consumptions of Turkey, Norway and Switzerland were added to find the natural gas 
demand in the OECD-Europe countries over the period 2000-2013.  
60 For GDP the reference base year is 2005. 
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Abovementioned in the Section 3.2.2 the natural gas demand in the EU countries 
has been estimated multiplying projected demand of the OECD-Europe countries by  
correction factor, 0.91. 
4.2. DATA ANALYSIS 
4.2.1. Security Supply Analysis 
Security supply analysis includes two steps. These steps are the demand-supply 
balance assessment and the calculation of the indices. In each scenario if the demand-
supply balance assessment fails, the indices will not be estimated.   
4.2.1.1. Scenario 1: No Export (Base Scenario)  
In Scenario 1, the conditions of the EU natural gas market over period from 2016-
2030 are analyzed by assuming that US LNG exports are not implemented. Before 
calculating HHI, SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 indices, balance check between natural gas 
supply and demand are made to analyze whether current and prospective natural gas and 
LNG exporting countries could fulfill the EU’s natural gas. The supply and demand of 
natural gas in the EU countries over the period 2016-2030 are illustrated in Figure 28.  
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Figure 28: The market share of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market from 
2016 to 2030 for the Scenario 1 
 
*includes Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Israel and Cyprus. 
Source: Eurogas, Dickel, et al. 2014, Mitrova 2014, Duval 2011 and author’s estimations 
Regarding Figure 28 natural gas supply from existing and prospective suppliers is 
not sufficient to feed the EU’s natural gas market starting from 2017. For this reason, the 
indices to analyze the EU natural gas market could not be calculated.      
As a result, if the EU countries do not diversify their natural gas suppliers as soon 
as possible, they will face with natural gas deficiency in the following years. 
4.2.1.2. Scenario 2: Low/Slow Export Rate 
Scenario 1 shows that the EU countries will challenge the natural gas deficit in 2017 
if natural gas and LNG will not be supplied from the new suppliers such as the US. In the 
Scenario 2, the effects of the LNG exports from the US emerging with 6 billion cubic feet 
per day (Bcf/day), phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/day per year starting from 2016 are analyzed. 
Under these circumstances, the US market share in the EU natural gas market varies from 
2% in 2016 to 11% in 2025.  
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Figure 29: The market share of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market from 
2016 to 2030 for the Scenario 2 
 
*includes Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Israel and Cyprus. 
According to Figure 29, the EU countries could solve shortcoming of natural gas 
until 2025 by importing LNG from the US. While both indigenous natural gas production 
and natural gas exports from the existing suppliers decrease, US LNG exports may 
compensate this reduction until 2025. Also, US LNG exports to the EU countries will 
impact the EU natural gas market in the period between 2015 and 2025. After 2025 the 
member states should find new natural gas suppliers or increase the export rate of natural 
gas under existing natural gas contract. For this reason, the indices, such as HHI and SWI 
indices, can only be calculated for this timespan. 
Although US LNG exports under the condition of low/slow Scenario (Scenario 2) 
affects the EU natural gas market between 2016 and 2021, market dominance of some 
exporting countries does not weaken considerably in this period. Therefore, HHI indices 
do not decrease below 1500 and this situation represents the prevalence of moderately 
concentrated market condition (Figure 30).  
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Figure 30: Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices over the period 2016-2025 for the Scenario 2 
 
Similarly, the impacts of US LNG exports can be seen from Figure 31. An increase 
in SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 indicates the improvement of the EU’s supply security of natural 
gas. Also, the effects of the parameters (political stability and the share of indigenous 
production in the total energy supply) on the market can be seen easily. When the values 
of SWI and SWI-1 are taken into account, they alter from 1.14 to 1.34 and this rise indicates 
the diversification of natural gas exporting countries over the period from 2016 to 2025. 
Unlike SWI and SWI-1, an increase in SWI-2 values becomes comparably lower because 
of depletion of the EU’s domestic natural gas resources. 
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Figure 31: SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 over the period 2016-2025 for the Scenario 2 
 
As a result, low/slow scenario affects the EU’s natural gas market until 2025. After 
this year additional volume of natural gas and LNG should be imported by the EU countries 
to prevent the supply deficiency.  
4.2.1.3. Scenario 3: Low/Rapid Export Rate 
When the volume of exported LNG by the rate of 6 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 
3 Bcf/day per year is considered, similar outcomes are obtained with the Scenario 2. 
Although initial export rate and the market shares of the US in the EU natural gas market 
are higher in this scenario than the ratios estimated in the Scenario 2, the market share of 
the US increases up to 11%.  
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Figure 32: The market share of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market from 
2016 to 2030 for the Scenario 3  
 
*includes Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Israel and Cyprus. 
As shown in Figure 32, US LNG exports help the EU countries to fulfill the natural 
gas demand over the period 2016-2025. But total natural gas and LNG supplies become 
insufficient after 2025. The gap between supply and demand widens between 2026 and 
2030. 
Figure 33: Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices over the period 2016-2025 for the Scenario 3 
 
The market share of the US in the EU natural gas market does not illustrate 
noticeable differences between the Scenario 2 and 3. As illustrated in Figure 30 and 33, 
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nearly same HHI indices for the period between 2016 and 2025 are obtained from these 
scenarios. In other words, the LNG trade from the US to the EU countries with the rate 
described in the Scenario 3 will create nearly same impacts on the natural gas market. The 
competition in the EU natural gas market ascends incrementally and market conditions do 
not change too much for these two scenarios. 
The decline in the market share of some exporting countries and a rise in the US 
market share result in some alterations in the EU natural gas market. As illustrated in Figure 
34 while SWI and SWI-1 improve significantly, SWI-2 related to the annual rate of 
indigenous natural gas production grows incrementally.   
Figure 34: SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 over the period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 3 
 
Unlike HHI index, impacts of US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market are 
felt when SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 indices in the Scenario 2 and 3 are compared. Regarding 
the security of the natural gas supply, the improvement of the EU natural gas market in the 
Scenario 3 is more than the Scenario 2. 
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4.2.1.4. Scenario 4: High/Slow Export Rate 
When considering the amount of investment on the liquefaction plants and 
nameplate capacities of these plants, the US can export more than the volumes described 
in previous scenarios. In the light of this fact, when US LNG exports with a rate of 12 
Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/day per year (high/slow scenario) are analyzed, the 
outcomes are different from the results in the Scenario 1, 2 and 3. 
Regarding the demand-supply balance assessment, the volume of natural gas found 
by aggregating indigenous production and natural gas exports could fulfill EU natural gas 
demand between 2016 and 2030 (Figures 35). While an increase in the export rate from 1 
Bcf/day to 12 Bcf/day rises the US market share in the EU natural gas market from 2% in 
2016 to 22% in the years between 2027 and 2030, the LNG exports from the US increase 
competition in the market.   
Figure 35: The market share of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market from 
2016 to 2030 for the Scenario 4  
 
*includes Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Israel and Cyprus. 
With starting LNG exports from the US in 2016 HHI values decrease persistently. 
While HHI is 2574 in 2016, this value drops to 1937 in 2030 (Figures 36). This decline 
represents the diversification of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market. 
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Figure 36: Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices over period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 4 
 
The slump in the market share of certain exporting countries such as Russia and an 
increase in the US market share affect the EU natural gas market. As shown in Figure 37 
while SWI and SWI-1 illustrate similar and considerable improvement, SWI-2 related to 
the annual rate of indigenous natural gas production increases incrementally.   
Figure 37: SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 over the period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 4 
 
Under these circumstances in the Scenario 4, US LNG exports become more 
meaningful than previous scenarios. While US LNG exports help the EU countries to feed 
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their natural gas glut, it increases competition in the market and also improves security of 
natural gas supply. 
4.2.1.5. Scenario 5: High/Rapid Export Rate 
When the volume of LNG exports from the US increases, the structure of the EU 
natural gas market transforms. Due to advantageous US LNG prices the EU countries 
would prefer to export LNG from this country instead of importing from other suppliers 
with low political stability indices. In the light of this approach, when LNG is imported 
from the US with a rate of 12 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 3 Bcf/day per year, the impacts 
of this transaction would be higher than preceding scenarios. After initializing the US LNG 
exports, the US’s market share in the EU countries will rise abruptly from 6% in 2016 to 
22% in 2022 (Figure 38).   
Figure 38: The market share of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market from 
2016 to 2030 for the Scenario 5 
 
*includes Nigeria, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Oman, Egypt, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Israel and Cyprus. 
As illustrated in Figure 39 pipeline gas and LNG will be imported from mainly 
Russia, Norway, Algeria and the US in this scenario. The reduction in the number of 
suppliers affects HHI indices dramatically. While the structure of the EU natural gas 
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market in 2016 and 2017 is highly concentrated, it becomes moderately concentrated as a 
result of plunging HHI values after 2017.   
Figure 39: Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices over period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 5 
 
Similar to HHI, an increase in the US dominance on the EU natural gas market and 
a slump in Russian market share affect SWI and SWI-1 indices. Amount of rise in these 
indices is higher than the Scenario 2, 3 and 4 from 2016 to 2030. As shown in Figure 40 
depletion of the EU’s natural gas reserves causes a moderate increase in SWI-2.   
Figure 40: SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 over the period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 5 
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Regarding the outcomes of the security supply analysis for the Scenario 5 the 
volume of US LNG exports is the primary determinant. The higher volume of US LNG 
exports is, the more effective US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market are.  
4.2.1.6. Scenario 6: Flexible Export Rate 
Heretofore limited LNG exports from the US to the EU countries are analyzed. The 
results of previous scenarios illustrate that high volume of LNG exports helps the EU 
countries to mitigate Russian dominance in the EU natural gas market and to diversify 
natural gas suppliers. For this reason, unlimited or flexible LNG export rate is expected 
more effective than the previous scenarios.   
Figure 41: The market share of natural gas suppliers in the EU natural gas market from 
2016 to 2030 for the Scenario 6 
 
Similar to other scenarios natural gas supply is equal to an aggregate of indigenous 
production and imported natural gas and LNG. The EU countries will most probably prefer 
to import LNG from the US because of comparatively lower natural gas prices in the US; 
therefore, it is assumed that LNG is only imported from the US for this scenario. According 
to this assumption the US’s market share is 6% in 2016 and increases 27% in 2029 (Figure 
41).    
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Figure 42: Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices over period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 6 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 41 natural gas is imported from Russia, Norway, Algeria 
and the US. In other words, the number of suppliers in this scenario decreases and their 
market shares escalate especially the US’s share. Fluctuation of the market share results in 
reduction of HHI indices from 2016 to 2030 (Figure 42). HHI value in 2016 is 2,596 with 
the market shares: 36% (indigenous production), 25% (Russia), 23% (Norway), 23 % 
(Algeria) and 9% (the US). HHI index in 2030 drops to 2,193 with reshaping of the EU 
natural gas market regarding following shares: 26 % (domestic production), 15 % (Russia), 
20% (Norway), 12% (Algeria) and 27% (the US).     
In the Scenario 6 a plunge in HHI indices is not as much as in the previous scenarios 
because the EU countries supply natural gas from only four countries compared to the other 
scenarios in which there are at least five exporting countries.   
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Figure 43: SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 over period 2016-2030 for the Scenario 6  
 
As exhibited in Figure 43 SWI, SWI-1 and SWI-2 indices, as well as HHI, do not 
change with introducing US LNG to the EU natural gas market with ascending volume. In 
other words, LNG exports only from the US in addition to Russia, Norway and Algeria do 
not impact the EU natural gas market as expected. 
As a result, although the volume of US LNG exports is one of the main 
determinants for diversification of natural gas suppliers, the number of suppliers and their 
market shares are the other vital parameters for the improvement of the market.  
When considering the results of all scenarios, US LNG exports become helpful and 
meaningful for the EU countries if the considerable amount of LNG is exported to the EU 
natural gas market by the US. Moreover, variety of the natural gas suppliers is another 
significant issue that the EU countries should consider. For these reasons, the most 
effective scenarios are determined as Scenario 4 and 5.      
4.2.2. Economic Impact Analysis 
In the first part of this section, US LNG exports are analyzed whether they do or do 
not affect the security of natural gas supply in the EU natural gas market. To make final 
remarks economic impact analysis should be carried out. 
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Before analyzing impacts of US LNG exports on the EU countries, natural gas 
demands in these countries over the period 1997-2014 are estimated by using Eq. 1161 
given in Section 3.2.2 and compared with the real demand values to check reliability of the 
model described by O. Dilaver and her colleagues. The differences between forecasted and 
realized EU natural gas demand given in Figure 44 fluctuate in the ranges between -10% 
and 10% in the years between 1997 and 2014. In this period, the average deviation between 
these values becomes -1.5%. 
Figure 44: Forecasted and realized EU natural gas demand over the period 1997-2014  
 
In the second part of the economic impact analysis the change in demand of natural 
gas in the EU countries is estimated for the years between 2016 and 2030. In these 
calculations three scenarios (low, reference and high) are analyzed to determine natural gas 
prices and GDP values that are illustrated in Figure 45 and 46.   
 
 
 
                                                 
61 UEDT values were taken as 0.01239, -0.00685 and -0.002 for the periods 1995-1998, 1999-2011 and 2012-
2014, respectively. 
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Figure 45: Natural gas prices over the period 1995-2030  
 
Figure 46: GDP in the OECD Europe countries over the period 1995-2030  
 
After implementing three scenarios the results shown in Figure 47 do not conform 
to the expected values. At the outset of this study it is assumed that there are no impacts of 
US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market. But the outcomes of the economic impact 
analysis exhibit that reduction in natural gas prices will generally cause an increase in 
natural gas demand in the EU countries. 
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Figure 47: Natural gas demand in the EU countries regarding reference, low and high 
scenarios  
 
As given in Table 10 after initialization of US LNG exports the natural gas demand 
in the EU countries rises gradually. For the low case scenario in which the growth in natural 
gas price and GDP are defined as 2% and 1% per annum respectively, the natural gas 
demand will ascend less than 1% in the period 2016 and 2020. In the following five years 
a slump in the natural gas demand is observed. Unlike the change in the years between 
2021 and 2025 the natural gas demand increases incrementally.  
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Table 10: Summary of the changes in natural gas demand in the EU countries over the 
period 2011-2035 
Time 
Growth in Demand (%) 
Low Scenario Reference Scenario High Scenario 
2016 0.812 2.024 2.718 
2017 0.682 1.892 2.585 
2018 0.681 1.891 2.583 
2019 0.681 1.891 2.584 
2020 0.680 1.890 2.582 
2021 -0.420 0.777 1.462 
2022 -0.420 0.777 1.462 
2023 -0.421 0.776 1.461 
2024 -0.422 0.775 1.459 
2025 -0.421 0.775 1.459 
2026 0.192 1.396 2.084 
2027 0.192 1.396 2.084 
2028 0.191 1.395 2.083 
2029 0.191 1.394 2.082 
2030 0.191 1.395 2.082 
For the reference case scenario, the natural gas price and GDP are assumed to grow 
1.5 and 2% annually from 2016 to 2030. Under these circumstances three distinct trends 
are observed. In the first part including the period 2016-2020 an increase in demand is 
around 2%. The pace of growth in the second period (2021-2025) is less than the rise in 
the first part and it becomes 0.78%. In the final portion the alteration in the natural gas 
demand is approximately 1.4%. 
For the high case scenario when the changes in natural gas prices and GDP are 
taken as 0.5% and 2.5% per annum, the tendency of the growth in the natural gas demand 
is similar to the reference case scenario. Averagely, the natural gas demand increases 2.6% 
in between 2016 and 2020; these rates become 1.5% and 2.1% in the periods 2021-2025 
and 2026-2030, respectively. 
In addition to analyzing three scenarios, the effects of the natural gas price 
fluctuation are tested. While the growth rate of natural gas price is altered, other parameters 
 92 
specified in the reference case scenario are kept constant from 2016 to 2030. The outcomes 
are given in Table 11. 
Table 11: Annual growth rate of the EU natural gas demand regarding alteration of 
natural gas prices 
Annual change of natural gas 
prices (%) 
Annual growth in natural gas demand (%) 
2016-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030 
0.5 2.04 0.92 1.54 
1.0 1.99 0.85 1.47 
2.0 1.84 0.7 1.32 
3.0 1.70 0.56 1.17 
4.0 1.55 0.41 1.02 
5.0 1.41 0.27 0.88 
10.0 0.70 -0.45 0.14 
-0.5 2.22 1.07 1.69 
-5.0 2.90 1.72 2.30 
The smaller the change in natural gas prices is, the higher the growth in natural gas 
demand is. For example, if natural gas prices increase 1% annually, a rise in natural gas 
demand becomes 1.99%, 0.85% and 1.47% for the periods 2016-2020, 2021-2025 and 
2026-2030, respectively.  
To sum up, the consequences of the economic impact analysis of US LNG exports 
to the EU countries are as follows: 
 If existing price formation methodology based on the HH prices persists in calculating 
the US LNG prices, US LNG exports will result in convergence of pipeline gas and LNG 
prices in the EU natural gas market.   
 Depending on a rise in natural gas prices in the EU natural gas market, the natural gas 
demand in the European countries will deviate over the period 2016-2030. For all 
scenarios, initial market reaction to the LNG exports is an increase in natural gas demand. 
According to the outcomes of low, reference and high case scenarios, it is expected that 
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annual growth in the EU natural gas demand will become approximately 0.7%, 2% and 
2.6% in the period between 2016 and 2030. 
 Although the volume of the US LNG is one of the main determinants for the security 
supply analysis, this parameter does not impact the EU natural gas market economically. 
Unlike the volume of US LNG exports, US LNG prices will shape the natural gas market 
in the EU countries. 
 GDP, as well as LNG prices, is another essential variable to forecast the EU natural gas 
demand. Therefore, the final remarks depend on the growth in GDP. The higher the growth 
in GDP in the EU countries is, the more impacts on the market are.       
4.3. VERIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESES  
The aim of this study is to find the answers of the below questions: 
1. What advantages can the EU anticipate from natural gas imports from the US? Will this 
trade be a panacea for the EU’s countries to solve the problem related to the security of 
natural gas supply? 
2. Will the US natural gas export reduce the EU’s dependence on its main suppliers?  
3. Will the LNG imports from the US change the EU’s natural gas demand? 
 To achieve the aim of this study, the following hypotheses were tested:  
H0: Natural gas supply security of EU countries will not be affected by LNG imports from 
the US.  
H1: Natural gas supply security of EU countries will be affected by LNG imports from the 
US.  
At the beginning of this research, I expected is to accept the null hypothesis. 
When considering the results of the security supply and economic impact analyses, 
the null hypothesis should be rejected and alternative hypothesis (H1) should be accepted. 
Depending on the volume of US LNG exports, LNG trade will have an impact on the EU 
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natural gas market. For the economic impact analysis, the implementation of US LNG 
exports will affect the formation of the EU natural gas prices positively. They will be re-
adjusted according to the US LNG prices. This alteration in the prices will cause an increase 
in the EU natural gas demand. 
In the light of these outcomes, the questions can be replied as follows: 
1. Conditionally, US LNG exports will provide many advantages to the EU countries. They 
will give them an opportunity to re-negotiate their long-term natural gas contracts. 
Secondly, they would cause a slump in natural gas prices in the EU natural gas market. 
Although US LNG exports are not an elixir for the EU natural gas market to improve its 
security supply, they will lessen the dominance of some exporting countries on the market. 
2. US LNG exports will not decrease the EU’s dependence on its suppliers. Because the 
EU countries will most probable prefer to import LNG from the US and under these 
circumstance the US market share in the EU natural gas market will rise. This situation 
prevents to improve the security of natural gas supply in the EU market.   
3. US LNG exports will result in a rise in the EU natural gas demand. With an increase in 
GDP of the EU countries, the initialization of US LNG exports will lead to a decline in the 
EU natural gas prices. Regarding to reference case scenario the EU natural gas demand is 
expected to grow 1.9%, 0.8% and 1.4% over the periods 2016-2020, 2021-2025 and 2026-
2030, respectively. 
 
 95 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Final Remarks 
5.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As the cleanest-burning fossil fuel, natural gas has gained ground in the EU energy 
market for the last three decades due to EU’s concerns about climate change and the EU’s 
stringent policies to de-carbonize its energy systems. In spite of the importance of the 
natural gas demand in the EU countries, natural gas supply and insufficient domestic 
natural gas production in the member states have become essential challenges that make 
access to affordable, stable and sustainable natural gas from various suppliers at the top of 
the EU’s agenda.  
Even though considerable amount of natural gas is imported via well-connected 
pipelines from several exporting countries, such as Russia, Norway and Algeria, to fulfill 
the EU’s natural gas need, some EU countries, such as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland 
and Bulgaria import their whole natural gas needs from a single supplier (Russia). 
Disruption of Russian gas, resulting from the disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006, 
2009, and 2014, has endangered the security of natural gas supply at national and the EU 
level. Also cutting off the natural gas supply from Russia has increased energy 
expenditures in the EU countries. These problems have compelled the EU to take measures 
to mitigate the impacts of Russian natural gas disruption. Hence, diversification of both 
routes and sources has been the EU’s priority to meet the EU’s natural gas demand.  
To strengthen energy independence and to ensure the security of natural gas supply 
in the EU natural gas market, efficient use of the opportunities such as importing LNG is 
defined as one of the essential measures in recent EU’s regulations (e.g. the EU’s Energy 
Security Strategy (COM/2014/0330)). Although the construction of new pipelines is 
counted as a solution in these regulations, long construction period of new gas transmission 
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system and the requirement of capital-intensive investment have made LNG imports 
especially from the US important in the last two years.   
The EU countries have been facing hardships about the security of natural gas 
supply. Meanwhile, advances in drilling technologies and production strategies such as 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have made shale gas more accessible and 
boosted indigenous natural gas production in the US since 2007. The US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) expects that the growth in natural gas production in the 
US, as a result of the shale gas boom, would provide an opportunity to the US to be a net 
natural gas exporter in the foreseeable future. By exporting LNG to the EU countries the 
US could help its allies, the EU countries, to reduce Russian hegemony in the EU natural 
gas market. 
Even though both sides have made many infrastructural and legal arrangements, it 
is not yet known whether US LNG exports are or are not an elixir for the EU natural gas 
market. For this reason, impacts of US LNG exports on the EU gas market are analyzed in 
this thesis. During measuring the effects of US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market, 
three essential issues are investigated:      
1. What advantages can the EU expect from natural gas imports from the US? Will this 
trade be a panacea for the EU’s countries to solve the problem related to the security of 
natural gas supply? 
2. Will the US natural gas export reduce the EU’s dependence on its main suppliers?  
3. Will the LNG imports from the US change the EU’s natural gas demand? 
At the beginning of this thesis, it is expected that the security of natural gas supply 
in the EU countries will not be affected from US LNG exports. To accept or reject this 
hypothesis, this thesis is structured in five chapters to analyze impacts of US LNG exports 
on the EU’s natural gas market. The basics of the LNG markets are described in Chapter 
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Two. Chapter Three reviews the methods used to verify correctness of the hypothesis. 
Chapter Four discusses the assumptions used to analyze impacts of US LNG exports on 
the EU’s gas market and presents the results of the models described in Chapter Three. In 
the final chapter (Chapter 5) some conclusions and final remarks are drawn.  
As a result of the security supply and economic impact analyses, main findings are: 
-Security Supply Analysis: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Shannon-Wiener 
Index (SWI) and modified SWIs (SWI-1 and SWI-2) are calculated. During estimation of 
these indices, some parameters, such as the market share of indigenous production and 
political stability index of the exporting countries, are used. As a result of these 
calculations, the volume of LNG exports from the US and the number of suppliers are 
found as two main determinants for diversification of natural gas suppliers and 
improvement of the market.  
To answer the research questions and find impacts of US LNG exports on the EU 
natural gas market six different scenarios defined by the EIA’s 2011 Annual Energy 
Outlook are analyzed. The results of analyses show that US LNG exports become helpful 
and meaningful for the EU countries if the considerable amount of the US LNG is exported 
to the EU natural gas market. Moreover, variety of the natural gas suppliers and their 
market shares are discovered as other significant determinants that should be taken into 
account by the EU to solve the problem about security of natural gas supply. In the light of 
these outcomes, US LNG exports with a rate of 12 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 1 Bcf/day 
per year (high/slow scenario) and 12 Bcf/day phased in at a rate of 3 Bcf/day per year 
(high/rapid scenario) seem as the most effective scenarios.  
-Economic Impact Analysis: The natural gas demand model formulized by O. 
Dilaver and her colleagues is used to measure the economic impacts of US LNG exports 
on the EU countries. To construct this model while the natural gas prices and GDP values 
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of OECD-Europe countries from 1978 and 2011 are taken as primary parameters, the 
Structural Time Series Model (STSM) with the Underlying Energy Demand Trend (UEDT) 
concept is used to forecast the European natural gas demand (OECD-Europe). The 
consequences of this analysis are: 
 With initialization of US LNG exports, the prices of pipeline gas and LNG in the EU 
natural gas market will converge to each other.   
 Although the EU natural gas demand will deviate over the period 2016-2030 due to a rise 
in natural gas prices in the EU natural gas market, generally, the EU natural gas market 
will react positively to US LNG exports by an increase in natural gas demand. According 
to the outcomes of low, reference and high case scenarios, annual growth in the EU natural 
gas demand is anticipated to be approximately 0.7%, 2% and 2.6% in this period. 
 While the volume of the US LNG is one of the main determinants for the security supply 
analysis, it does not affect the EU natural gas market economically. As an independent 
from the volume of the US LNG, LNG prices always shape the market in the EU countries. 
 GDP and the LNG prices are vital variables to predict the EU natural gas demand. In 
other words, the final remarks on the impacts of US LNG exports on EU natural gas market 
depend on the growth in GDP and LNG prices. The higher the growth in the GDP of the 
EU countries is, the more impacts of US LNG exports on the EU natural gas market are. 
Unlike GDP, an increase in LNG prices negatively affects the EU market and lessen the 
impacts of US LNG exports.       
When taking the findings of the security supply and economic impact analyses into 
consideration, outcomes contradict the hypothesis about insensitivity of the EU natural gas 
market to US LNG exports. Depending on the volume of natural gas export and the LNG 
prices, the LNG trade between the US and the EU countries will provide some benefits, 
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such as a growth in the EU natural gas demand, improvement of competition in the market 
and convergence of the pipeline gas and LNG prices. 
5.2. FINAL REMARKS 
On the contrary to the initial expectation, analyses exhibit that US LNG exports 
will have the impacts on the EU natural gas market. Even though these results conform to 
the studies performed by optimistic scholars and consulting companies, certain concerns 
still exist about the effects of US LNG exports on the EU market. 
 Although the LNG markets in the US and the EU countries are well-developed and 
deregulated markets, they are structurally distinct from each other as mentioned in Chapter 
Two. Unlike the US natural gas market, the EU gas market generally depends on long-term 
contracts with take-or-pay obligations. Also, the EU has a fragmented market structure 
regarding country-based policies and markets’ dynamics. While the Central and Eastern 
European countries with illiquid market and oil-indexed natural gas prices mainly utilize 
carbon intensive solid fossil fuels, Northwestern European countries (including Italy) 
prefer to use less carbon intensive fuels like natural gas to achieve the 20/20/20 targets. In 
the northwestern part of Europe, the market has growing based on hub-trading (like NBP), 
liquidity, and spot-based pricing. These differences between the natural gas markets cause 
uncertainties during forecasting improvement of natural gas market in competition and 
natural gas demand. 
In addition to structural perplexities in these markets, models used in the analyses 
are based on many assumptions. In security supply analysis, many parameters such as the 
depletion rate of the EU’s indigenous production and natural gas (and also LNG) capacity 
delivered by the exporting countries under the long term contracts over period 2015-2030 
are assumed. To illustrate, EU domestic natural gas production is assumed to decrease by 
1%, 2% and 1.6% annually over the periods 2015-2020, 2020-2025 and 2025-2030 
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respectively. Also, US LNG exports to the EU countries are anticipated to implement at 
the outset of 2016 and only certain scenarios given in the EIA’s 2011 Annual Energy 
Outlook are analyzed.  
Similarly, many assumption are made to measure the economic impacts of US LNG 
exports. For example, the price of natural gas, is estimated by assuming that price formation 
in the OECD-Europe countries and the EU countries is based on the volume-weighted 
average prices. The shares of pipeline gas and LNG in the EU natural gas market over 
period 2014 and 2030 is assumed as 90% and 10%, respectively. Correction factor to 
convert forecasted natural gas demand of OECD-Europe countries to the demand of the 
EU countries is taken as 0.91. 
Existence of many uncertainties, such as volatile natural gas prices and instable 
growth in the EU countries, affects reliability of the models. Hence, the outcomes of 
security supply and economic impact analyses should be used as supplementary 
determinants.   
Although abovementioned uncertainties decrease the reliability of the analyses, the 
results of the analyses give good indication for US LNG exports to the EU countries. For 
this reason, the outcomes found in this study could help LNG investors, politicians and the 
regulators in both the US and the EU countries. Both the US and the EU countries should 
seek the other opportunities before implementing US LNG exports. While the US analyzes 
the other options like exporting LNG to markets in Asia-Pacific or South America, the EU 
countries should investigate other natural gas suppliers and resources, such as shale gas 
production.      
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Abbreviations 
$/bbl US Dollar per barrel 
$/MBtu US Dollar per million British Thermal Unit 
$/Tpa US Dollar per tonnes per annum 
€/Mwh Euro per megawatt-hour 
AEO Annual Energy Outlook 
Bcf Billion cubic feet 
Bcf/d Billion cubic feet per day 
Bcm Billion cubic meters 
Bcm/d Billion cubic meters per day 
Bcm/y Billion cubic meters per year 
BP British Petroleum 
BREE Australian Government Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics  
CAAGR Compounded Average Annual Growth Rate 
CEGH Central European Gas Hub 
CH4 Methane 
DOE The US Department of Energy  
E&P Exploration and Production 
EC European Commission 
EIA The US Energy Information Administration 
ENI Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 
EU The European Union 
FERC The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
FPSU Floating Production and Storage Unit  
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FPU Floating Production Unit  
FTA Free Trade Agreement  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
GIIGNL International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers 
HH The Henry Hub 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
IEA International Energy Agency 
IGU International Gas Union 
JCC Japan Crude Cocktail  
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
m3 Cubic meter 
MBtu Million British Thermal Unit 
Mcm/day Million cubic meters per day 
MENA The Middle East and North Africa  
Mt/y Million tonnes per year 
Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent 
Mtpa Million tonnes per annum  
NBP The National Balancing Point 
NCG Net Connect Germany 
Non-FTA Non Free Trade Agreement 
OECD The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PEGS Points d’Echange Nord 
PSV Punto Di Scambio Virtuale 
STSM The Structural Time Series Model  
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SWI Shannon-Wiener Index 
Tcf Trillion cubic feet 
TIGF Points d’Echange Sud 
TTF Tile Transfer Facility 
UEDT The Underlying Energy Demand Trend  
UK The United Kingdom 
US The United States of America 
WIPO The World Intellectual Property Organization 
ZEE Zeebrugge 
$/bbl US Dollar per barrel 
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Nomenclature 
(Pav)t  Average price of imported natural gas at year t, $/MBtu 
(PHenry Hub)t  Average price of natural gas at Henry Hub at year t, $/MBtu 
(PLiquefaction)t  Average cost of liquefaction process at year t, $/MBtu 
(PLNG)t Average price of imported LNG at year t, $/MBtu 
(Ppipeline gas)t  Average price of imported pipeline natural gas at year t, $/MBtu 
(PRegasification)t  Average cost of regasification process at year t, $/MBtu 
(PShipping)t  Average shipping cost from the US to the EU countries at year t, $/MBtu 
bi Index of political stability of country i, ranging from 0 to 1  
Dt Total natural gas demand at year t, Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
gi The share of indigenous production in the total consumption 
gt  The natural logarithm of natural gas demand at year t 
Gt   Natural gas demand at year t, Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
It Amount of imported natural gas purchased under long term contract at 
year t, Billion m3 (Bcm) 
LNGt  Projected LNG demand at year t, Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
pt The natural logarithm of natural gas price index at year t (2005=100) 
Pt  Natural gas price index at year t (2005=100) 
Qt Indigenous natural gas production at year t, Billion m
3 (Bcm) 
Sn The market share of the firm  
UEDTt  Underlying Energy Demand Trend for natural gas at year t 
xi The fraction share of the imports from supplier i 
Xt  The share of pipeline gas in the total natural gas import at year t 
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yt The natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at year t (US 
Dollar 2005= 100 PPP) 
Yt  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at year t (US Dollar 2005= 100 PPP) 
Greek alphabets 
εt  A random error term 
βt The slope of the UEDT  
μt  Level of the UEDT at year t 
Subscripts and superscripts 
t Year 
av Average 
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